SUDANIC STATECRAFT? POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN THE EARLY NAPATAN PERIOD

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ABSTRACT

The Piankhyl Victory Stela contains several anomalies that have caused interpretive problems for Egyptologists. These difficulties stem from the assumption, inspired by the Egyptian appearance of their monuments, that the early 25th Dynasty kings were attempting to rule in the same way as traditional Egyptian kings. This paper argues that by utilizing the segmentary state model as an interpretive framework, a concept derived from African anthropology that has already been shown to have much utility for the study of later periods of Sudanese history, many of these apparent contradictions can be resolved.

In approximately 750 BCE, the Nubian king Piankhyl invaded Egypt and installed himself as king there. The 25th Dynasty of “black pharaohs” that followed (c. 750 - 657 BCE) is doubly unusual in the context of Egyptian history. Firstly, because it was of Nubian, rather than Egyptian, origin; and secondly, because despite their Nubian origins, the Nubian kings chose to present themselves so much like Egyptians. 25th Dynasty monuments in both Egypt and Nubia are in a very Egyptian style, and therefore the conventional scholarly narrative has stressed that Nubian rulers, since they look so much like Egyptian kings in their monuments, must have ruled in a very similar way to Egyptian kings. This is seen to be a part of a program of “Egyptianization” in which Egyptian practices were preferred to native Nubian cultural forms and systematically replaced them in Nubian culture. How we should understand the interplay between the Nubian background of the 25th Dynasty kings and the Egyptian influences on their culture is a complex question that has begun to receive greater scholarly attention; but, generally speaking, the Egyptian iconography and cultural forms favored in the material culture of the Nubian rulers, combined with the Egyptological training of those who study them, has led to a privileging of Egypto-centric explanations for 25th Dynasty remains. The view that the Nubian rulers were eager and able to so completely assimilate to Egyptian culture is one that has its origins in outdated interpretations of Nubian culture as inferior to the glories of Egyptian civilization, and should be re-examined; it also does not take into account the possibility that material appearances do not necessarily reflect cultural realities. The possibility that the Nubian kings of the 25th Dynasty were less “Egyptian” than they appeared and that native Nubian culture still influenced their behavior, especially in the period immediately following their arrival in Egypt, should be considered.

The idea that there was an overwhelming Egyptian influence over the culture of the Nubian rulers during the 25th Dynasty raises several questions that must be addressed. By the time our first major historical source for the period, Piankhyl’s Victory Stela, had been erected, Nubia had claimed control over parts of Egypt, and Egyptianizing tendencies had been seen in Napat mortuary culture, for only just over thirty years. It is unlikely that Nubian kingship bore much resemblance to Egyptian modes of governance before the 25th Dynasty, as can be seen both from the very un-Egyptian displays of royal power at the site of Kerma, and also inferred from the ecology of Nubia, which differs from that of Egypt and does not favor a highly centralized Egyptian-style state organization. Is it possible or likely that Nubian rulership could have been transformed into an Egyptian form in such a short period at the beginning of the 25th Dynasty?

Moreover, the 25th Dynasty is an extremely exciting period from a Nubologist’s point of view, as it is the first time that continuous text is used by a Nubian culture, and the first time Nubian rulers are responsible for the construction of monumental stone buildings. There was no tradition of writing or monumental stone carving in Nubia before the 25th Dynasty, and therefore the Napat kings relied on Egyptian models when presenting themselves in these media. When considering the 25th Dynasty use of Egyptian forms, it should be considered to what extent the Nubian rulers were constrained by an Egyptian linguistic and visual vocabulary that was incapable of accurately reflecting Kushite culture. The extremely consistent nature of kingship, and the repetitive way in which it is discussed in Egyptian texts, means...
Kathryn Howley | Sudanic Statecraft? Political Organization in the Early Napatan Period

that it would have been extremely difficult to express non-
Egyptian modes of rulership within the parameters of a vocabulary
that was so embedded in Egyptian culture. In other words, it is
possible that Nubian rulers appeared Egyptian because it would
have been extremely difficult for them to use Egyptian art and
writing to present themselves otherwise.

If the early 25th Dynasty rulers were still to some extent
operating as Nubian kings, is it possible to uncover Nubian
traditions that underlie the Egyptian appearance of our evidence?
The political organization of later periods in Nubian history,
especially the Meroitic state, has been a popular topic of discussion
in recent years, particularly in the work of David Edwards. As part
of the wider scholarly trend that seeks to separate Nubia from the
intellectual influence of Egyptology and put it into its wider
African context, Edwards reconsidered how the Meroitic state was
administered, utilizing the theory of the “segmentary state”
derived from African anthropological thought. Since Meroitic is
still for the most part undeciphered, Edwards had only
archaeological evidence available to him to investigate this topic.
While he constructs a very persuasive argument for the
applicability of the segmentary state model to the Meroitic state,
he is forced to use the direct historical method and employ textual
evidence from later, medieval periods of Nubian history.

Given Edwards’ success with the Meroitic period, it might be
productive to re-examine also the evidence of 25th Dynasty texts in
the light of the segmentary state model to see whether our view of
Napatan state organization should be modified. This approach
seems especially appropriate since there appears to have been some
degree of continuity between the Napatan and Meroitic states.
Moreover, assessing the applicability of the model to the 25th
Dynasty is likely to be an easier task than for the Meroitic Period,
since the 25th Dynasty is one period of Nubian history where there
are numerous (legible) textual sources available to us that could
furnish information about political organization in Nubia. Jeremy
Pope has recently discussed the model of the segmentary state in
the conclusion of his book on governance during the rule of the
later 25th Dynasty king Taharqo. Although he does not apply
the theory specifically to any of the historical problems discussed in
the book, he notes that many of the features of states normally
discussed under the model of the “segmentary state” resonate with
aspects of Taharqo’s governance, and suggests that certain so-
called “anomalies” in later 25th Dynasty administration may be
resolved if seen through the lens of such a model. In this paper, I
would like to test the utility of the application of the segmentary
state model to the Napatan Period more extensively by expanding the
focus to the Early Napatan period, and examining one particular textual source in detail in the light of this model. The
Victory Stela of Piankh will serve as a case study, since as the
longest Napatan text surviving, it has much information that
could be useful to a discussion of Napatan kingship and political
organization. Moreover, as it dates from the beginning of the
Napatan period, the mechanisms of Nubian rulership are less
likely to have been changed or adapted through contact with
already existing ideas and institutions in Egypt. The stela also has
a number of interpretative difficulties that have not thus far been
solved through our current understandings of Egyptian
governance; non-Egyptian theories of state organization might
therefore be able to offer new insight into this important historical
text.

A discussion of political organization in the Early Napatan
period and what, if any, influence Egyptian practices had on it, can
only be accomplished with a proper understanding of the state
structures that were in place in Egypt when the Napatan rulers
arrived. While commentators such as Török have often assumed
that an Egyptian model of governance is what the Napatan kings
were striving for, kingship as it was being practiced in Egypt at the
time of the Napatan invasion was not of the “traditional” Egyptian
form. During the Third Intermediate Period, many kings ruled
small sections of Egypt concurrently and not necessarily in
competition with one another. This is in contrast to the “single
king of all Egypt” model that the Napatan rulers are thought to be
emulating. Recent scholarship on the political organization of the
Libyan period in Egypt suggests that a decentralized state
organized along segmentary lines would not have been foreign to
the Egyptian population when the Nubians invaded, and begs the
question of whether the Nubians would have thus been familiar
with the practice of a strongly centralized state, let alone sought to
emulate it?

PROBLEMS WITH ASSUMING AN EGYPTIAN MODEL FOR EARLY NAPATAN STATE ORGANIZATION

The Piankh’s Victory Stela was discovered in 1862 in the
colonnaded court of the great temple at Gebel Barkal. Dated to the
twenty-first year of Piankh’s reign, it is made of granite and
measures 1.8m tall, 1.84m wide and 0.43m deep, with the
inscription running around all four sides of the object (figure 1).
It was found with one other sandstone stela from considerably
earlier in Piankh’s reign, year three, and next to a New Kingdom
stela of Tuthmosis III.

At the apex of the lunette of the stela is a sun disk with two
uraei (figure 2). Below are depicted three central figures, all
oriented rightwards. A damaged figure of Piankh stands before a
human-headed Amun, seated on a throne and wearing the double-
feather crown. In his left hand he carries a was-sceptre, and in his
right, an ankh symbol. Behind Amun stands Mut at a slightly
smaller scale, wearing the double crown and carrying an ankh
in her right hand. To the right of the central group are two registers
of figures. Facing the central group in leftward orientation is
the wife of the Heliopolitan ruler Nimlot, wearing a long, loose dress
and with her right hand raised in supplication. Behind her at
slightly smaller scale is Nimlot himself, wearing a bag wig and long
kilt. His right hand holds aloft a sistru, while his left grasps the
harness of the horse he is leading. In the register below are three
prostrate figures of kings Osorkon, Iuput and Pefetjawybast. On
the right of the central group, facing right, are another two
registers of prostrate rulers, two on the upper register and three

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31
on the lower. Their names are given as the Great Chief of the Ma, Akanosh; the Great Chief of the Ma, Djedamuniufankh; the i-ry-p‘t Padiese; the hity. Patjuny; and the hity. Pamai. All the figures on the lunette are labeled with their name and title; this group of Egyptian rulers represents those described in the main text of the stela as Piankh’s adversaries.

The text of the stela relates the military campaigns of King Piankh against several Egyptian rulers who are described as rebelling against his rule. Piankh, while residing in Nubia, hears of the Delta dynast Tefnakht’s attempts to expand his territory southwards into Upper Egypt. Piankh mobilizes his army, who unlike him are seemingly already in Egypt, and eventually goes northwards himself into Egypt to deal with the troublesome Tefnakht, stopping along the way at Thebes to celebrate the Opet festival. During the course of his journey downstream, Piankh receives the submission of many Egyptian towns that have deserted him, successfully besieges Hermopolis, and finally wages a successful battle against the forces of Tefnakht at Memphis. Once he has received the submission of all the local Egyptian rulers, Piankh completes various religious rites at Heliopolis and Athis in the north of Egypt, and finally sails victorious back to Nuba, the adoring cries of the population of Egypt ringing in his ears.

As a stela with lunette-shaped top, the form of the object that bears the inscription is Egyptianizing, and the inscription is written in Middle Egyptian hieroglyphs. Piankh calls himself by the Egyptian kingly title nswt-bity, and ascribes his kingship to Amun, a god of Egyptian origin (e.g. the caption on the lunette in which Amun addresses Piankh: “I have given to you [the land].”). The inscription recounts how he took part in the Egyptian Opet festival (line 29), among others. Unsurprisingly, therefore, this text has traditionally been seen as Piankh trying to assume the mantle of the ideal form of Egyptian kingship. The accounts of his campaigns up the Nile are read as his desire to conquer all of Egypt in order to reunite the country, as all good Egyptian kings were able to do. However, several things about the scene and text do not fit comfortably into this model.

Since the stela is written in Middle Egyptian, a language that had not been spoken in Egypt for roughly one thousand years and was probably almost unknown in Nuba, it is likely that Piankh had Egyptian craftsmen at his disposal to compose and carve the stela. In addition, the text of the stela appears consciously to emulate earlier Egyptian royal texts; the setting of the action is
familiar from the könignovelle genre (iw.n.tw r dd n hm=f, line 2), the depiction of Piankh as warrior king recalls many of the
textual clauses in the battle sequences of Seti I and Ramesses II, and much of the phrasing strongly echoes the stela of Thutmose III next to which the Victory Stela was erected. Therefore Piankh and/or his craftsmen must have been extremely well acquainted with Egyptian material and textual culture: it is highly likely that they could have made the Victory Stela a completely Egyptianized object, had they so desired. The form of Piankh’s earlier stela of year three at Gebel Barkal was in fact a lot more closely related to Egyptian traditions than the Victory Stela, again suggesting that Piankh’s craftsmen were familiar with traditional Egyptian forms. There is a more traditional arrangement of gods and the king on the lunette of the year three stela than on the Victory Stela: Piankh also uses an early form of his titulary, which appears to be consciously based on that of Thutmose III, whose stela neighbors Piankh’s at Gebel Barkal. The physical proximity of the Victory Stela to other Egyptian and Egyptianizing monuments strengthens the argument that the differences in the Victory Stela to standard Egyptian practice are due to conscious choices, and not to misunderstanding or ignorance of the appropriate Egyptian models.

Since the production of the Victory Stela was obviously informed by a deep familiarity with Egyptian textual traditions, the numerous differences that do appear between this stela and its Egyptian counterparts seem to have been conscious decisions designed to express a Nubian form of rulership. The inscription of the stela on all four sides is unusual; there is only one other stela known with the same arrangement of inscription as the Victory Stela, that of Harsiyoof, which is also a Nubian rather than Egyptian monument. The Victory Stela lunette’s composition is also very unusual from an Egyptian standpoint (figure 2). In particular, Piankh faces away from the god in the center of the scene receiving the submission of the kinglets, while Egyptian kings would be expected to face towards the god while giving offerings. The prominence of royal women in Nubian society has often been remarked upon, and this trend is also visible on the stela; Nimlot’s wife appears on the right upper register before her husband, in the position usually reserved for men. A horse also makes an unusual appearance behind Nimlot, and the importance of these animals continues in the main text of the stela, in the famous episode in which Piankh becomes angry at Nimlot’s maltreatment of his horses (lines 64-9). But perhaps the most unusual feature of the lunette is that the other rulers depicted, although paying fealty to Piankh, are acknowledged as kings themselves. Nimlot on the upper right register, and Osorkon, Iuput and Pefjaywast on the lower right, are all labeled with cartouches and the title of nswt. In Egyptian ideology, these features are reserved solely for kings, and therefore this portrayal of Piankh’s vassals does not fit with the view of traditional Egyptian kingship.

The usage of ranking titles in a way not normally seen in Egyptian is a pattern that is repeated throughout the stela. The term “nswt,” “kings” in the plural, is even used to talk about the four kings shown on the lunette (e.g. line 17). This plural form is an extremely rare word in Egyptian, as the idea of more than one king existing at a time is inconceivable in Egyptian ideology: the plural in Egyptian usage before the Late Period is generally restricted to discussion of the early kings (for example, in king lists) or in genitive phrases such as “king of kings.”

Not only can many men hold the title “king” at once on the Victory Stela, but the use of the title “king” is also often associated with the title hityw, which in Egyptian usage is given to men of a far lower rank than king. In contrast, it seems to denote individuals of a similar status on the Victory Stela. Tefnakht is called “wr n Immtt,” “great man of the west” (line 19), and wr n M, “chief of the Ma” (line 126), while also being described as the superior of Nimlot and the other “nswtyw”; since a nswt is described as “being at the feet” (md wy n, line 20) of a wr, this again subverts the normal order of rank in Egyptian thought. It is clear that on the Victory Stela, Egyptian political ranking titles are not used in the same way as in Egyptian texts.
This difference could perhaps reflect a different, Nubian way of understanding politics; or at least, a Nubian willingness to describe politics in a way that Egyptians, constrained by traditional kingly iconography, would not. The unusual use of titles in the Victory Stela of course to some extent reflects the Egyptian political reality that many local rulers existed at the beginning of the 25th Dynasty, and two of the four nswt-bity in the Piankhy Stela are known to have presented themselves with this title.19 However, there are two unusual features about the use of terms such as nswt-bity in the Victory Stela that may be considered particularly Kushite. First is the acknowledgment of this reality of many local rulers. During the Third Intermediate Period, no other royal sources mention the existence of such rulers, even by lower-ranking titles than ‘king’; the Victory Stela is therefore unique in its prominent presentation of them. Similarly, at the beginning of the 26th Dynasty, the new Saite kings once more show their adherence to traditional Egyptian kingship iconography by ignoring the existence of these local rulers.20 Secondly, when examining the number of local rulers in the Third Intermediate Period and Late Period who claim the title nswt, it is clear that this was a very unusual title for a local ruler to adopt.21 Only 16% of local rulers bear a royal titulary,22 and of the 22 such rulers, 16 of them date to the 25th Dynasty. Four post-date the 25th Dynasty, while only one local ruler is known to have used a royal title in the Third Intermediate Period (one example is of unknown date).23 This implies that the collection of nswt-bity that appear on the Victory Stela are not merely a representation of decentralized Third Intermediate Period Egyptian political organization, but are rather a depiction of a phenomenon that was introduced in the 25th Dynasty. The sudden appearance of royal titles in the self-presentation of local rulers in the 25th Dynasty, combined with the acknowledgment of these titles in the Victory Stela, makes it tempting to think that the local rulers suddenly adopted such titles when they had not been able to in the Third Intermediate Period because the Nubian kings permitted it.

In addition to the non-standard use of language, the events narrated by the stela also contain several unusual features that have caused interpretative problems for scholars in the past. Piankhy is described in the stela as easily defeating the Egyptian kinglets when he invades:

"Then they fought against "the peak, great of victories," finding it filled with troops comprising every valiant warrior of Lower Egypt. Then a battering ram was employed against it, so that its walls were demolished and a great slaughter made among them in incautable numbers, including the son of the Chief of the Ma, Tefnakht ... he made himself a camp at the southwest of Hermopolis, keeping a stranglehold on it daily. A talus was made to clothe the wall, and a platform was erected to elevate the archers when shooting and the slingers when slinging stones, slaying the people among them daily ... then

Hermopolis threw itself upon its belly"24 (Victory Stela, lines 27-33)

In particular, the siege warfare technology that is described is especially advanced.25 Yet despite his military superiority, once Piankhy has secured oaths of fealty from the kinglets he has fought (in particular Tefnakht, lines 140-144), he returns to Nubia without removing the Egyptian kings from office or seemingly leaving any of his own officials in power: “his majesty then sailed southward with his heart gladdened and all those on both sides of him shouting” (line 155). How should we reconcile this picture of military aggression and success, followed almost immediately by retreat?

Piankhy’s actions at the end of the Victory Stela have caused most previous scholars to assume that the Nubian victories described are either mere royal grandstanding, or that the campaign had exhausted Piankhy’s resources; in either case, their assumption is that Piankhy had aimed to become sole king of Egypt, but was unable to do so. Reflective of this view among the authors of the main histories of the period is Morkot: “Despite his successes, Piye had failed to crush Tefnakht completely and may have felt that Tefnakht’s power had been sufficiently limited by the war for him to be unable to rapidly recover”.26 Redford, in a similar vein, writes that “one is strongly tempted to conclude that the incessant sieges, assaults and battles over many months had exhausted the Nubians... Piankhy had reached the point of loss of both strength and élan... [he] had lost the final contest with his enemy Tefnakht’s”.27 Goedicke likewise asserts that “Pi(ankh)y is paring the political scene with substantial material but without political gains”.28 However, as Redford himself acknowledges, “there is something suspicious in all this” if we are to assign any truth to Piankhy’s claims of victories.29 Spalinger, having analyzed the military aspects of Piankhy’s campaign, concludes that “Piye was not interested in conquering all of Egypt”30 rather than being unable; but why could this be? Why would a ruler go to the trouble of a lengthy campaign with periods of siege warfare, and the acquisition and transport of all the equipment that it entails, only to receive a relatively small amount of booty (Piankhy is careful to note that the majority of the tribute he receives is allocated to the Amun temples in Egypt) and a pledge of loyalty?

The problems that scholars have noted in the interpretation of the Victory Stela largely stem from the assumption that because Piankhy called himself nswt-bity and gave himself other Egyptian royal titles in his inscriptions, he was the ruler of a highly centralized state in Kush and sought to administer Egypt in a traditional Egyptian way. As already mentioned, however, there are other reasons than Egyptomania that Piankhy could have used Egyptian language and iconography in his monuments. The development and political organization of Nubia until the 25th Dynasty was quite distinct from that of Egypt, with periods of centralized power such as the Kerma Kingdom being the exception rather than the norm.31 Even in these periods, the exact degree of centralization is unclear. Therefore the supposition that the Napatan kingdom structurally resembled the Egyptian one, or
that Piankh as King of Kush would automatically seek to act in the same way as an Egyptian head of state, is not necessarily valid. Moreover, as discussed above, at the time Piankh invaded, Egypt was ruled by a patchwork of local potentates rather than a single, strong king. In other words, it is unlikely that the early 25th Dynasty kings would have been familiar with centralized political control within Nubia, or that they would have had direct experience of a strongly centralized state in Egypt on which to model their own system of governance.

**THE “SEGMENTARY” AND “SUDANIC STATE” MODELS**

Many other theories of state organization exist other than that of the centrally administered polity, and as we have seen, the applicability of such a model to Nubian contexts may be limited. David Edwards has argued instead for the need for “models of state development based on African data” when considering Nubian political organization.32 One model in particular has seen great applicability in Africa and especially the Sudan; that of the “segmentary state”.

The theory of the segmentary state was first proposed by British anthropologist Aidan Southall in the 1950s, based on his ethnographic fieldwork in Uganda among the Alur people.33 Southall noticed that while the Alur did show kinship (“stateless”) organization, they were also a widely spread and numerous group that had enough cultural connections and communication to be considered as a kind of state.34 This political organization enabled the realization of collective activities among the Alur on a larger scale than neighboring clan groups without such political organization were able to achieve.35 There were many different Alur lineage groups, and while they shared a culture and in some specialized matters were subject to the authority of the chief, in many other areas they were self-governing.36 Thus considerable political responsibility was left to the heads of local groups, and the chief would only step in if directly requested to by the local head, or when violent and unresolved disorders required the chief’s intervention.37 Since the chiefs relied more on the influence of their ritual and supernatural authority to bring them tribute and services and were less involved in the day-to-day running of society, the segmentary state can be characterized as being more highly centralized ritually than politically.38 Oral histories further revealed that on many occasions neighboring groups of different cultures and even languages could be absorbed into the Alur sphere and “Alurized”. This ability of the Alur to co-opt other groups into their political sphere, unlike other groups from this area, caused Southall to try and elucidate the “political techniques of immigrant groups in the process of establishing domination”39 and thereby develop the model of the “segmentary state” as an intermediate point between lineage organization and a fully centralized state.40 The four main characteristics of a state with such an organization are clearly summarized by Fuller, discussing Meroitic state organization:41

- There are numerous centers of political power.
- Political power is differentiated between royal, ritual *suzerainty* and the practical power (political *sovereignty*) held by the local elites.
- The royal center is organized through an administrative system and coercive force, while other locales of power repeat this structure on a smaller scale.
- The state is prone to fluctuations in size, especially at the peripheries.

Segmentary states as identified by Southall use force for raiding rather than conquest, and thus for acquiring wealth rather than for territorial acquisition.42 Legitimation of the royal power is achieved through religious symbols and redistribution of prestige goods to local elites,43 power as exercised in the segmentary state focuses on gaining influence over people rather than territory, through formation of alliances and situations of social debt.44

Edwards has sought to use this model in archaeological situations in sub-Saharan Africa by using the Direct Historical Method in order to infer the workings of the Meroitic State from those of the medieval Funj state; he terms this application of Southall’s model the “Sudanic State”. He and Dorian Fuller have used this model to elucidate the workings of the Meroitic state with great success, showing that Meroë’s territorial control was limited and changeable, especially at the peripheries of the Meroitic Empire.45 In addition, Edwards argues that long distance trade was dominated by royalty and likely took the form of ritual gift exchange, thus suggesting that this trade was used as a way of legitimating power rather than for modern ideas of profit.46

Edwards points out that the environmental conditions of Nubia favor non-centralized forms of government such as the segmentary state, a factor that applies as much to the Napatan period as to the Meroitic and medieval periods on which he works.47 The use of the segmentary state model is therefore likely to be a far more appropriate interpretative framework in which to examine Napatan political organization than the Egyptian centralized state, a model derived from a distinct culture with a different regional physiology than that of Nubia.48

**POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF EGYPT DURING THE THIRD INTERMEDIATE PERIOD**

The validity of the assumption that political organization in the early 25th Dynasty was based on traditional Egyptian forms of rulership is challenged by the independent evolution of Nubian kingship, but is also hampered by the realities of Egyptian kingship as it was practiced in Egypt at the time of Piankh’s invasion. Recent discussion in the Egyptological literature suggests that past scholarship has been restricted by its reliance on the model of the centralized state, and that broader models of state organization...
need to be considered for Egypt at this time period as well as for Nubia.

The differences between kingship as expressed in the Third Intermediate Period and the “traditional” kingship of the New Kingdom has caused scholars interpretive difficulty, just as in the case of the early Napatan period. The ruler Herihor of the 21st Dynasty granted himself a five-part titulary and was shown at Karnak celebrating a royal sed festival, both markers of Egyptian kingship. However, James and Morkot point out that previous scholars have preferred to think of his kingship as in some way “fictional,” because another ruler contemporaneously claimed kingship in Lower Egypt, while Herihor chose to stress his title of High Priest of Amun rather than that of “king.” Such difficulties can be alleviated by considering the theoretical basis of assumptions about rulership structures, as several scholars in recent work have demonstrated.

In an article discussing a newly discovered inscription of Osorkon I at Bubastis, Eva Lange examines what the text can tell us about political organization in Egypt under Osorkon. She points out that although the form of the inscription has clear Egyptian models in donation hymns, the content of the text is unusual. This situation very closely parallels what we have seen in the Victory Stela of Piankh, with its traditional Egyptian Königsnovelle setting but multiple acknowledged kings. Other scholars have noted that the Libyan kings of this period appear to retain aspects of Libyan kingship in their rule by dividing Egypt into feudal subdivisions and building small royal tombs within temple walls, and Lange argues that the new Osorkon text also makes it clear that brother succession was seen as normal in the Libyan sphere and was brought by the Libyan kings into their execution of the Egyptian kingship. Brockman expands on this argument, arguing that the Libyan tribal system was organized as a “patrilineal segmentary lineage system” (rather than a segmentary state) and that the influence of this political organization can still be seen in Egypt through the impotence of the notion of brotherhood, the retention of lineage titles, and the emphasis on genealogy which appears at this time.

The period of the Libyan kings in Egypt has left us evidence that has similar problems for Egyptologists as those that we see in the 25th Dynasty. The Victory Stela in its use of vocabulary suggests that multiple kings (nswyfwy) ruled in Egypt at one time under Piankh; since this does not agree with the Egyptian notion of one nsyt only, scholars have tried to explain this state of affairs as a misleading picture painted by the propaganda of a boastful king. In the Third Intermediate Period, the existence of multiple kings (as opposed to rulers) such as Herihor, have again been explained as fictional accounts by usurp priests. Brockman shows that by taking into account the system of political organization existing in Libya (which is very closely linked to the theory of the segmentary state), and the textual evidence of the period supporting its migration to Egypt, the presence of multiple kings can be tolerated in Egypt. This has several repercussions for our understanding of political organization in the Early Napatan period. Firstly, that textual material that relies on an extremely conservative and traditional Egyptian ritual vocabulary can mask changing forms of political organization that were influenced by the cultural background of the rulers. Secondly, that using alternative, non-Egyptian models of governance that reflect this cultural background can alleviate many of the interpretive difficulties periods of foreign rule have traditionally caused. And thirdly, that if a centralized state was not in existence in Egypt at the time Piankh invaded, his ability and desire to impose such a system in Egypt when it was familiar to neither him nor the Egyptians he was conquering should certainly be questioned.

The Applicability of the “Sudanic State” Model to the Victory Stela

As we have seen, the unusual use of iconography and language in the Victory Stela are among the clues that suggest this document does not record a purely Egyptian style of kingship. The work of Edwards and Fuller has clearly demonstrated that the “Sudanic state” model of statehood is a useful way of understanding political organization during later periods of Sudanese history. Both the apparent anomalies in the text of the Victory Stela and the decentralized nature of political control in Egypt during the Third Intermediate Period highlight the danger of assuming a traditional Egyptian centralized state in the early 25th Dynasty. It is therefore possible that the segmentary state model could be used profitably to examine the systems of governance of the Napatan state, and that the version of kingship described in the Victory Stela might be more coherent when investigated through such a lens.

As discussed above, among the aspects that do not fit into a model of traditional Egyptian state organization is the acknowledgment of the kingly status of other rulers of Egypt. Not only Piankh himself but also other rulers of inferior status are given the title nsyt. If we assume a method of political organization more akin to the Sudanese model than the Egyptian centralized state, this ceases to be a problem. The local elite, whether nsyt, hityc or wr, would have been expected to continue to exercise political control in their local area, though acknowledging the overall suzerainty of the Napatan king. What is important under the Sudanese model is that lesser rulers acknowledge the ritual authority of Piankh, as indeed they are shown doing in the Victory Stela. Despite all the rulers being referred to with kingly titles and cartouches (as can be seen on the lunette), Piankh is clearly presented as the only one of the rulers with a special connection to the god. He is granted, among others, the epithets “Horus mighty king” (line 71-72) and “Horkhent above the immortal stars” (line 75). Other rulers are not referred to with any religious epithets. The stela also makes clear that while the Egyptian kings are asked to provide exotic material goods to Piankh such as turquoise, lapis lazuli and myrrh, they must also grant endowments to the temples in Egypt: “then the treasuries and granaries of Memphis were assigned, made over to the endowments of Amun, of Pth, and of the Ennead in Memphis” (line 100) and “his granaries [were assigned] to the endowment of his father Amen-Re” (line 81). This concentration on the ritual
Aspect of kingship fits well with the extremely striking focus of the narrative on Piankh’s ritual activities: Piankh takes part in the Opet festival in Thebes (line 29) and visits numerous temples in the cities that he conquers, thus making it clear that he is ritually the king, even if he does not seek to have direct control over land or the political aspects of kingship.

The segmentary state model predicts that the ruler of such a state only becomes involved in the political running of the areas of the state outside the center when he is directly requested to by the local head, or when violent and unresolved disorders require his intervention.4 This seems to be one way of reading the state of affairs described at the beginning of the Victory Stela, when the wwr and ḥiwy-w “in Upper Egypt (an area which might have been under Nubian control since the time of Kashta—see below)” write to Piankh and ask him for help against the incursions of Tefnakht, accusing him of ignoring Upper Egypt (lines 6-8). There appears to be a more distant relationship between Piankh and the rulers of Upper Egypt than might be expected under a more centralized state model.

Piankh’s lack of concern over territorial control is also evident in the oaths that the four kings swear before him at Athribis, and in the oath of Tefnakht. Nimlot, Osorkon, Iput and Peftjawybasw swear that “my treasury will be open to you” and “I shall give you gold as much as you wish”, “anyone who hides his horses and conceals his wealth shall die the death of his father!” (lines 108-111). Tefnakht’s divine oath says “I will not disobey the King’s command. I will not thrust aside his majesty’s words. I will not do wrong to a count without your knowledge. I will only do what the King said. I will not disobey what he has commanded” (lines 142-144). In other words, the kings are not removed but permitted to remain as rulers, with the same territory as before, as long as they acknowledge Piankh’s superiority and give him tribute. The area thus becomes part of the Nubian state without direct political control being ceded to Piankh.

The focus in the Victory Stela on the ritual and symbolic nature of Piankh’s rule, rather than the political, and the lack of concern over direct control of land, does not fit in with the traditional Egyptian view of kingship and the state.5 It does, however, correspond closely with what might be expected from the ruler of a Sudanic or segmentary state. Viewing the events of the Victory Stela from this perspective allows us to reconcile the picture the stela gives us on the one hand of a vastly militarily superior Piankh, who on the other then leaves Egypt without making any territorial gains or “consolidating his power”.

**Other Textual Evidence of Political Organization from the Early Napatan Period**

Other textual evidence, both Egyptian and Nubian, from this period might also support the utilization of a segmentary rather than centralized state theoretical model when trying to reconstruct the political organization of this period. The earliest Nubian text we have is a stela of Kashta, found at Elephantine.65 This stela depicts Kashta with the local divine triad of Sater, Khnum and Anukis, showing the importance of Egyptian ritual to the Nubian king even before Piankh’s reign. More importantly, the Egyptian text identifies Kashta as asw-w-bitly with other traditional Egyptian kingship titles, and was set up in Egypt, suggesting that Kashta was acknowledged as having some degree of power in the south of Egypt at this time. It seems that, as in the case of his successor Piankh, Kashta did not seek to impose territorial control over Egypt, though he did obtain the ritual trappings of Egyptian kingship such as kingly titles.

More textual evidence from the reign of Piankh is available from the first stela he erected at Gebel Barkal, in year three of his reign. The text of the year three stela concentrates on the religious legitimacy of Piankh as king, with a speech of Amun granting him the crown of Egypt.67 The text also makes clear that it shares the same non-Egyptian view of kingship and political organization as the Victory Stela. Although Piankh is clearly the most important ruler as “ruler of every foreign land” (line 18), he also plans to appoint other, lesser rulers:

> “The one to whom I say: ‘You are chief’ [wr], he becomes chief. The one to whom I say: ‘You are not chief’ [by], he does not become chief. Amun in Thebes appointed me to be ruler in Egypt. The one to whom I say: ‘Appear (as king),’ he appears. The] one to whom I say: ‘Do not appear (as king) [by], he does not appear (as king)” — lines 18-20, Sandstone Stela68

The acknowledgment of other rulers reflects the picture of Nubian kingship seen in the Victory Stela in which other kings are tolerated in return for acknowledgment of the ritual supremacy of the Nubian king.

Other evidence from Egypt that dates to the early 25th Dynasty includes the “Smaller Dakhla Stela”: this monument was dedicated by the wr by Nesdjehuty.69 The Victory Stela suggests that men with the title wr in Egypt at this point were rulers who had a status and power similar to that of kings (wr being the main title of Tefnakht), and Nesdjehuty presents himself in the kingly position of offering to the god on his stela. However, the stela is dated to year 24 of the pr by Pyic,70 suggesting that although Nesdjehuty appears to have wielded some sort of (presumably local) political power, Piankh was acknowledged even in the Dakhla Oasisas a king.

Another example that might illustrate how the Egyptian population interacted with a non-Egyptian form of kingship is a mummy bandage discussed by Redford.71 The bandage preserves the name of Piankh and a damaged regnal date. The space available for the date suggests that it was too high to refer to a regnal date of Piankh, and might therefore have referred to the reign of another ruler. Moreover, other mummy cloths from Thebes at this period suggest that the regnal date is more likely to have referred to a local Theban authority.72 The mummy bandage would therefore acknowledge the kingship of Piankh by writing his name in a cartouche with full royal titulary, but would date the
document by the regnal year of another authority. Once again, if Redford's reading of the evidence is correct, 63 multiple rulers are being acknowledged in Egypt at this point, which is in contradiction to the traditional form of Egyptian kingship.

The evidence of the Dakhla Stela and the mummy cloth raise some interesting questions about the form of political organization in Egypt. While the segmentary state model could explain the actions of Piankh as portrayed in Nubian texts, it does not help us to understand how the Egyptian population reacted to this non-Egyptian form of kingship. However, the Egyptian evidence suggests that the Egyptians responded to Piankh's invasion in a way that is also very accepting of a separation between political and ritual sovereignty, recognizing the authority of multiple rulers at once. This might be thought surprising, given that it does not fit with traditional Egyptian kingship ideology, but as discussed above, Egyptians during the 25th Dynasty were accustomed to a far less centralized form of rule. Broekman discusses the evidence provided by a Third Intermediate Period stelophorous statue that bears a dedicatory inscription by the Theban king Harsiese, but which also carries the full titles of Osorkon III. 64 This evidence is of a very similar structure to that provided by the Dakhla Stela and Theban mummy cloth, with both local and Nubian rulers acknowledged. It suggests that the Egyptians in the early Napatan period were already accustomed to political organization based on a segmentary system from their acquaintance with the Libyan kings. They therefore did not find the situation that prevailed in the Napatan period of a local ruler and a Nubian king coexisting strange, but rather responded to it in the way they had for the earlier Libyan kings.

The evidence offered by the God's Wives of Amun in the 25th Dynasty can also support the idea that Nubian kingship in Egypt did not seek to reproduce traditional Egyptian kingship values. The God's Wives were able to arrogate many of the traditional privileges of traditional Egyptian kingship. A quarry inscription found in the Wadi Gasus, near the Red Sea, gives the names of Shepenwepet I and Amenirdis I (the daughter of Kashta) in cartouches, preceded by regnal year dates, thus presenting them in a similar way to kings. 65 The fact that the God's Wives seem to have sent out quarrying expeditions is also an activity usually reserved for kings. From evidence in Thebes, we also know that the God's Wives adopted a new, official name upon their coronation in the same way as kings, and enclosed this name in a cartouche. 66 God's Wives during the 25th Dynasty are also the only other official apart from kings to be noted as celebrating sed-festivals. 67 That the God's Wives under the Napatan kings were permitted (and, given that from Amenirdis I they were closely related to those kings, probably encouraged) to assume these titles and duties suggests that the privileges of kingship were not exclusionary during this period in the same way that they ideally was in Egyptian thought, in a manner consistent with the segmentary state model. The concentration of kingly attributes in what was a role associated with religious rather than territorial control could also be read as one manifestation of Sudanic political organization in the Napatan period.

**Objections to the Segmentary State Model**

Since its inception in the 1950s, the segmentary state model has received an extremely wide application in many areas of the world, ranging from ancient and mediaeval India to the Maya. 68 This broad applicability has led some to criticize the model, arguing that it is not a useful tool if it can be valid for states so separated in space and time. In the field of Nubian studies, Török has been particularly censorious of the efforts of Edwards and Fuller to apply the model to the Meroitic state, and writes that the segmentary state:

> “is one of those models which tend to live their own life without maintaining a well-balanced relationship to the evidence on which they are based. As it seems, its principal function is to replace the image of an ancient "territorial state with a centrally controlled economy" with a special African model.” 69

Jeremy Pope, in his examination of political structures under Taharqa, discusses extensively and clearly the problems with Török's criticism. Most notably he points out that Török's criticism of the use of such models is based on the assumption that they are being used from a structural-functionalist perspective, i.e. that those who use the segmentary state model are claiming that the states they discuss are segmentary states. Most scholars now would see their use of such a model rather as post-structural, and therefore as providing a way of identifying meaningful similarities with other “segmentary states”. 70 I side with Pope in rejecting the assertion of Török and others that the segmentary state model is not useful because of its wide applicability; many political models, such as that of the centralized or nation state, can be applied to a vast variety of societies. A model is not an objective reality or unseen rule that governs the behavior of societies, but rather a tool through which researchers may identify patterns throughout similar polities. Use of the same political model does not deny the individuality of each society. I would add to Pope's defense of the segmentary state that where this model is particularly useful is in encouraging scholars to look at evidence from a perspective different to their own political and scholarly experience. In the case of the Nubian material, it is especially valuable for suggesting an alternative to the clearly inadequate model of the Egyptian state that has been applied to Nubia as a result of the Egyptianization of royal Nubian material culture. As shown above, the evidence strongly suggests that political organization and kingship in Nubia were envisioned very differently than they traditionally had been in Egypt, and viewing the material through the lens of the segmentary state model is a good way of trying to filter out the Egyptianizing elements of the evidence as well as our own Western perspective.
Despite his complaint that the use of the segmentary state model is not inspired by the evidence, Török also recognizes that the evidence available to us does not support the existence of an Egyptian-style centralized state in Nubia during the Napatan period. Instead, he develops his own model of “ambulatory kinship” based on the archaeological evidence of multiple religious centers and royal palaces in use at one time in Nubia, and Napatan coronation inscriptions which suggest that Napatan kings were coronated in each religious center separately at the beginning of their reign.\(^1\) As Pope notes, “the segmentary state bears a striking similarity to the “ambulatory kinship” of Török.”\(^2\) Since it is a model of kingship rather than state organization, I agree that the two models need not be mutually exclusive, and it could be that the multiple centers that certainly existed under the Napatan kings represent smaller units of political organization that were unified under the kings’ religious leadership.

The continuing debates over how Napatan political organization should be reconstructed reflect the difficulties that scholars face when studying this period: there is not much evidence available to us as yet, political organization is extremely difficult to reconstruct from archaeological evidence, and difficulties in dating Nubian settlement remains to the Napatan period, all mean that this question is likely to remain troublesome for some time.\(^3\) However, as has been seen, kingship and political organization also appear to have been very different from the ideal Egyptian state at this time due to the influence of Libyan rulers; and therefore the existence of alternative frameworks of political structure in both Egypt and Nubia at this point ought not to be surprising, and should not be rejected until they have been thoroughly explored. As Morkot succinctly put it, “the model of the pharaonic monarchy has had a detrimental effect on the interpretation of Egypt under Libyan and Kushite rule.”\(^4\)

## CONCLUSIONS

The degree of similarity and difference between Egyptian and Nubian society in the 25th Dynasty has been a perennial subject of interest for Egyptologists and Nubiologists alike. The topic of political organization, though, is a difficult one to access from the information available to us. As is always the case with Napatan evidence, native Nubian qualities are likely to be somewhat obscured by the Egyptian linguistic and visual vocabulary used to express them. Nevertheless, encouraging results have been obtained by viewing the Merotic state through the segmentary state model, and the existence of detailed inscriptions such as the Victory Stela in the early Napatan period make applying this model to earlier Nubian material a promising approach. Many difficulties of interpretation in the Victory Stela can be ameliorated by viewing the narrative through this model of state organization that is different to the ideal Egyptian conception of rulership, and other textual and archaeological evidence support the possibility that the segmentary state model might be a more appropriate framework in which to discuss early Napatan political organization than the traditional Egyptian model. Although some scholars reject the existence of the “segmentary state,” the use of the model allows us clearly to articulate the differences between Nubian kingship and political organization, and the ideal of the Egyptian models on which the Nubian monuments were based. However, it also appears that the political situation in Egypt at this time deviated from the traditional Egyptian model, and might even have had some similarities with Nubian political structure. It is clear that the Egyptians’ repeated monumental presentation of their ideal political state throughout their history has obscured the wide variety of ways in which Egypt and Nubia were governed over time, but that by considering models drawn from other disciplines, there are ways in which these different political structures can be uncovered.

## NOTES


\(^5\) Pope, 291.


\(^7\) c.g. Anthony Leahy, “The Libyan Period in Egypt: an essay in interpretation,” Libyan Studies 16 (1985), 51-65; Eva Lange, “Legitimation und Herrschaft in der

8. The most recent scholarship suggests that Piankhy, rather than Piye, is the correct reading. See Claude Rilly, “Une nouvelle interprétation du nom royal Piankhy,” Bulletin de l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale 101 (2001), 351-368, for a brief and clear summary of previous arguments for the reading “Piye” and new arguments in favor of “Piankhy”.


10. Their names are given as Great Chief of the Ma, Akanosh; Great Chief of the Ma, Djedammiun-fankh: iry-p’t Padiès; biy-P’t Patjarfynj; and biy-P’t Ramadit.

11. For transcriptions, see H. Schäfer, Urkunden des ägyptischen Alters: Urkunden der äthiopischen Kaiserzeit vol. 31 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1905), and Nicolas-Christophe Grimal, La stèle triomphale de Pesankh by Musée du Caire, JE 48862 et 47086-47089 (Cairo: IFAO 1981).


14. An alternative way in which the Egyptians dealt with text too long to fit on one side of a stela can be seen in the Kmosela Stela, where one side of two stelae was used to accommodate the narrative.

15. Gozzoli 2010, 188.


17. Wörterbuch 2,329-331.

18. E.g. line 17: r dj t h3 nswtyw nn nswtyw hh n t-mhw y is, “list of the counts and kings of Lower Egypt;” line 113, dd.in nn n nswtyw hy’t-hy hsm-f, “these kings and counts said before his majesty”.


21. The criteria that distinguish “local rulers” from “kings” are enumerated by Moje, 8-9. Among the more important are that local rulers, in contrast to kings, do not date events to their own reigns, and do not use traditionally “royal” cemeteries.

22. Moje, 47.

23. Moje, 53.


25. The Nubian kings appear to have brought these techniques with them, since not only are the siege machines mentioned unknown from earlier Egyptian history, but the words that are used to describe them are only seen in 25th Dynasty texts: the word for ‘talus’, tr, appears to be a loan word from Semitic. Certainly, Egyptian unfamiliarity with these tactics would explain their easy defeat. iw, ‘battering rams’ (?); Wörterbuch 1-53: tr, ‘rampart around a city for a siege’, Wörterbuch 5-388: bikt, ‘a siege machine’, Wörterbuch 1-430.


27. Donald Redford, From Slave to Pharaoh: the black experience of ancient Egypt (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 122.


29. Redford 2004, 123.


33. The results of the fieldwork and the main features of the segmentary state deriving from it are discussed in Aidan Southall, Alur Society: a study in processes and types of domination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956).

34. Southall 1956, 69: “The sections of commoner clans which retain their sense of clanship although settled in widely different parts of Alurland contribute thereby to the self-awareness of Alur society as a meaningful unit”.

35. Southall 1956, 145.


37. Southall 1956, 237.


40. While the evolutionist implications of this are problematic and now out-of-date, Houston (“Classic Maya Politics” in Danien and Sharer (eds.), New Theories on the Ancient Maya (Philadelphia: University Press, 1992).
Museum, University of Pennsylvania, 1992), 8) argues that "arguably, the merit of the segmentary state model is that it bridges complex chiefdoms, which tend to have relatively small populations, and early states, which display a relatively high degree of stability and centralization".

Fuller, 173.

Aidan Southall, "The segmentary state and the ritual phase in political economy" in McIntosh, ed., *Pathways to Complexity in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 36.

Fuller, 174.

Fuller, 175.

Edwards 2008, 176; Fuller, 175.

Edwards 2008, 186.


See also Pope, 284-285.


e.g. Kenneth Kitchen, *The Third Intermediate Period in Egypt* (Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 3rd ed., 1996), 251: "The appearance of kingship was more impressive than the reality ... He remained as ever High Priest of Amun, military leader and Viceroy, even Vizier, but never king." Bonhémé holds a similar view: Marie-Ange Bonhémé, "Herihor fut-il effectivement roi?" *BIFAO* 79 (1979): 267-283. Broekman attacks the problem from the point of view of the entire Libyan period, but other more recent scholarship has also criticized these views from a more specific perspective, e.g. Ad Thijs "In Search of King Herihor and the Penultimate Ruler of the 20th Dynasty," *Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde* 132 (2005): 73-91.

Southall 1956, 237.

Compare, for example, the Senwosret III boundary stelae in Nubia talking about extending borders and controlling movement of populations through the territory.


"I am the one who has decreed (the kingship) for you," line 8 (Ritter, 462).

Trans. Ritter, 463.


The name as written here is Piye, not Piankh; Rilly, "Une nouvelle interprétation du nom royal Piankh," 355, argues that Piye is an abbreviated form of Piankh in much the same way that "Imeney" was a shortening of "Amenemhat".


Redford, 11, n. 46, referencing the following sources: G. Maspeta, *Les momies royales de Deir el-Bahari* (Cairo, 1884), 555, fig. 14, 564, 567, 572, 579; Gauthier, *Livre des rois III* (Cairo, 1914), 244 (III-IV), 263(1), 270(1), 275(IV-V), 276f.

Note that Kitchen reads a different date: Kitchen, Third Intermediate Period, 152 n. 292.

Broekman, 90, CG 42208.

Ritter, 461.


Ayad, 110-115.


Török 2008, 162.

Pope, 287.


Pope, 291.
