THE EIGHTH CAMPAIGN OF THUTMOSE III REVISITED

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ABSTRACT

One of the most decisive rivalries in the history of the Ancient Near East during the Late Bronze Age was between Egypt and Mitanni. Starting around the beginning of the fifteenth century B.C.E. this rivalry reached its pinnacle during the reign of Thutmose III (1490-1436 B.C.E.). Among the military campaigns he directed towards the Levant, his eighth campaign, in year 33 of his reign, has been perceived in scholarly study of this conflict as the highest point. Owing to an exceptional variety of written sources which had been dedicated to its commemoration, as well as the implementation of some unprecedented tactical military moves in the course of this campaign, it won its grandeur, second only to the Megiddo campaign. This paper aims at reanalyzing and reinterpretating the sources concerning the eighth campaign. Further investigations into the sources from the time of Thutmose III and a reconsideration of former views about the significance of this campaign bring us to an alternative conclusion: the eighth campaign was mainly a symbolic display of power, with no more than a demonstrative consequence. The actual confrontation between the parties would take place two years after the eighth campaign.

THE BACKGROUND

The rising of Mitanni as a major protagonist in the geopolitics of the Ancient Near East can roughly be dated to the 16th Century B.C.E.1 The start of Egypt’s long-lasting conflict with Mitanni can be associated with the Euphrates campaign of Thutmose I.2 This conflict reached the highest point at the time of Thutmose III during his military activity in the Levant. The first campaign of Thutmose III was directed towards Megiddo. There, the main rival of the Egyptians was the ruler of Kadesh on the Orontes. Nothing in the narrative of the first Campaign explicitly points to a direct involvement of Mitanni in this strategically significant battle. Yet, the prevalent political circumstances by that time do not preclude an indirect involvement from the side of Mitanni, as a driving force at the least.3 However, it is the eighth campaign which, unequivocally, highlighted the prolonged hostility between Egypt and Mitanni.

Thutmose III embarked on his eighth campaign in year 33 of his reign. Since his first campaign to Megiddo, year 22 of his reign4 he travelled northward six times more, sometimes every year.5 His campaigns during this time seem to have signaled a consistent effort to disseminate a feeling of Egypt’s might and horror among various political entities dwelling, mainly, along the Lebanese Coast. Among the major power centers of the Levant which Thutmose III confronted during these campaigns the following can be named: Ullaza and Ardat in the fifth campaign, year 29,6 and Kadesh in the sixth campaign, year 30.7 It seems that the departure to the eighth campaign occurred about 16-18 months after the return of Thutmose III from his seventh campaign, regnal year 31. Redford suggested that this relatively extended time lag was a consequence of the preparation taken at Thebes for the king’s second Sed Festival.8 It is also possible that the preceding three campaigns, regnal years 29-31, in the course of which Egypt regain its deterrence against Kadesh and Tunip, had temporarily stabilized the Egyptian sphere of influence in the Lebanon.

Whatever the reason for this delay may be, it credited Thutmose III with the required time to prepare his eighth campaign gradually and thoroughly. The future campaign was to become distinctive and second only to the first campaign in assortment of commemorative sources. Its grandeur is enhanced not only by its wide-ranging and colorful documentation, but also by its brilliant tactical military movements that shaped its image as well. These aspects have made the eighth campaign one of the most glorious achievements of Thutmose III in his struggle against Mitanni, and one of his most laudable campaigns in general, as has been demonstrated in scholarship from the time.

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the study of this campaign began.9

Yet, as one delves deeper into the written sources, the traditional view about the role of this campaign becomes more questionable, mainly with regard to its mode of operation, its consequences and long-term effects. These issues are discussed in the following paragraphs.

THE SOURCES AND THE LITERARY ASPECT OF THE EIGHTH CAMPAIGN

The eighth campaign was commemorated in a variety of sources.10 Its narrative is delivered through official compositions, and selected episodes thereof are commemorated in private sources as well.11 A glance at the literary format of the main source dealing with the campaign furnishes us with a point of departure to the following historical analysis.

THE ANNALS INSCRIPTION

The Annals Inscription of Thutmose III purports to be the most authoritative source of information for the eighth campaign. Engraved on the walls surrounding the Holy of Holies in the heart of Karnak Temple,12 it lists Thutmose’s campaigns in the course of his first twenty years of sole regime (years 23–42). The narration of the first campaign is an in-detail, comprehensive account of events.13 In sharp contrast is the narrative style of most of the later campaigns.

The phraseology of the narratives of the (relatively) minor campaigns in the Annals Inscription, conducted after the first campaign, can schematically be formulated as follows:14

1. Setting for the campaign: The king is at Retenu (or other locality in the North of the Levant).15
2. Attacking and destroying the city of X16
3. Looting of the above-mentioned city.17
4. Lists of the booty.18
5. Lists of inw and hiw deliveries from various political entities and principalities in the Levant and other regions during the year of a given campaign.19

The core of this narrative style is the so-called “day-book report”20 – purposefully composed of details in laconic fashion, originating from records of the king’s house. The details are
sober, systematically arranged and poorly embellished with background occurrences.21

A look at the record of the eighth campaign reveals a striking similarity to the textual structure of the records of all later campaigns led by Thutmose III after the first campaign. First, it is implied through the heading of the narrative of the eighth campaign. Like all other later campaigns the narrative opens with the setting for the major events to come: ‘Lo, his majesty is at Retenu (ist bnnj by Rtw)’22. No background retrospective like the one in the prologue of the first campaign is presented. Unlike the first campaign, no incentive for campaigning in year 33 is reported. The narrative continues immediately to the highlight of the eighth campaign – the crossing of the Euphrates. Subsequently, a descriptive report of the ensuing events follows, intermingled with other components ubiquitous in narratives of the later campaigns. Admittedly, the narrative of the eighth campaign exceeds narratives of most later campaigns with lively descriptions of the events. However, narratives of other later campaigns are also not completely devoid of descriptions as such.23 In this respect, the eighth campaign ought to be considered as an integral component of the later campaigns, for having been treated in the Annals Inscription more like its counterparts than the first campaign.

An overview of the events which occurred during the eighth campaign, together with other events worthy of mention from the same year, can demonstrate the above-given observation:24

1. Narrative foreword.25
2. Crossing the Euphrates. Setting a stela and providing the harbors.30
3. Pursuit after the defeated enemies.27
4. A reference to the crossing (the place name was not preserved).29
5. A reference to an act of destruction (the place name was not preserved).29
6. Arrival at Nij on the way back from the Euphrates.30
7. Inw of rulers of Retenu.31
8. Providing the harbors.32
9. Inw of a foreign ruler (?).33
10. Inw of the ruler of Babylon.34
11. Inw of a foreign ruler.35
12. Inw of the ruler of Hati.36
13. Return to Egypt after the campaign.37
14. A Reference to the bhw of Punt.38
15. A reference to the bhw of Kush.39
16. A Reference to the bhw of Wawat.40

ROYAL STELAE

The eighth campaign was alluded to in a few royal stelae as well. Two of them are the main sources for this campaign apart from the Annals Inscription. The texts on both stelae mainly contain episodes from the first and the eighth campaigns, intriguingly enough, in a reversed order:

1. Gebel Barkel Stela.41
2. Armant Stela.42

The next two are fragments of royal stelae which apparently preserve allusions to the eighth campaign, although this cannot easily be asserted:

3. A fragment of a stela in the University Museum, Philadelphia.43
4. A fragment of a stela found in Tell Kinrot/el-Oreimeh, Lower Galilee.44

ADDITIONAL ROYAL SOURCES

Three other monuments were engraved with laudatory inscriptions for Thutmose III, all refer to the eighth campaign:

1. The obelisk in Constantinople, originating from Karnak temple.45
2. The Poetical stela.46
3. A doorpost of the Seventh Pylon at Karnak dated to Thutmose III.47

TOPOGRAPHICAL LISTS

The comprehensive assemblage of toponyms known in scholarly terminology as topographical lists are thought to be indispensable sources for the study of the eighth campaign. Helck provided the most refined illustration of the use of this source as essential for any reconstruction of the progression of the campaign,48 along with Astour’s study integrating Egyptian toponyms with place names from Alalah.49

As useful as this source might seem, in the view of the present author it is considerably less reliable than it is perceived. Suffice it to mention two major impediments regarding its historical worthiness. First, its ascertainment specifically to the eighth campaign has nothing to rely on. We cannot tell whether the extended list48 alludes to the eighth campaign or generally refers to the Lebanese and Syrian sphere of Egyptian involvement by the Time of Thutmose III.49 Second, any attempt to draw a sensible line of progression of a given Egyptian campaign according to the topographical lists composed at the time of Thutmose III, is impeded by lack of basic geographical consistency in the order of the toponyms. Redford’s response to the ‘progression approach’, mainly advocated by Helck, is sufficient to demonstrate the intricacy of the topographical lists as a means for historical Study. He wittily asserts that, regarding the order of the toponyms, “... one might easily be led to the further supposition that the field commander of the Egyptian army was drunk.”50
Studies concerning the topographical lists keep on emerging.53 Still, uncertainties regarding the corpora of toponyms from the time of Thutmose III remain unresolved. It is beyond the scope of this paper to expand on this issue. Yet, further scrutiny is needed in order to seek for a different perspective of using the topographical lists as a source of information.54 For the time being, I rather prefer to draw out the topographical lists from the inventory of the pertinent data relating to the eighth campaign. Contrary to this situation, the next available source is more compelling and illuminating.

PRIVATE SOURCES

Composed of private autobiographies, or the like, of high officials who evoke their part in selected episodes from the eighth campaign. Contrary to the official sources, the private ones shed light on relatively minor episodes unattested in the royal inscriptions and furnish further corroborations to the main events familiar from the Annals Inscription and the royal stelae:

1. Amenemheb55

The major private source for the eighth campaign. This person had taken part in military campaigns under Thutmose III although he reached his highest position under Amenhotep II.56 The authenticity of his autobiography is corroborated by allusions of some of the major episodes of the eighth campaign mentioned in the official sources i.e. the arrival at Mitanni, the crossing of the Euphrates and the elephant hunt in Nij.57 In addition, his autobiography exclusively contained valuable information about episodes which none of the official records mention. It is highly probable that partially, at least, they relate to the eighth campaign although this is arguable.

A few more officials have selected episodes from the eighth campaign worth mentioning in their autobiographies as well:

2. Minmose.58
3. Iamunedjeh.59
4. Menkheperraseneb.60
5. Iwj-Montu.61

Bearing in mind the inconsistencies among the various sources – some of them are frustratingly schematic, others biased or tendentious – we turn to a thorough historical analysis of the available information. The first step will be the point of departure of the eight campaigns from the Lebanese coast, the phase of the final preparations, equipping and organization.

THE PREPARATIONS TO THE CAMPAIGN

The most distinctive operation carried out during the eighth campaign is the crossing of the Euphrates and the logistic preparations for it. A distinctive feature of this undertaking is the construction of boats which were intended to carry the Egyptian army across the river. The boats were built in ‘the Vicinity of Mistress of Byblos’ (m hsw tī nbt Kpntj), aimed at being transferred to the bank of the Euphrates by means of carts drawn by oxen.62 This endeavor was seemingly about to signal a new approach for Egyptian military activity in the Levant and meant a brilliant use of logistic capabilities.

Nonetheless, a few remarks should be made in this regard. Both reflect the actual background for this one-time demonstration of creativity. The first one concerns the availability of raw materials for the boats’ construction. Although the Nile valley provided a fair amount of wood for local consumption,63 the Cedar of Lebanon64 was the preferable type of wood for ship building of various categories65 as well as components of temples and cult installation66 and funerary objects.67 Consequently, Lebanon became a focal point of interest for the Egyptian as soon as their monarchy was established.68 By the beginning of the New Kingdom Period the Egyptians already had constituted a supply system of wood from the Levant, including cedar.69 It was Thutmose III who established an independent infrastructure for cedar production and supply in Lebanon, around Byblos.70

61 It is explicitly maintained in the Gebel Barkal stela that this wood supply from Lebanon was a kind of monopoly held by the Egyptians and yearly guaranteed.71 The main agent in charge of this multifarious task was the Egyptian army.72 Moreover, the Gebel Barkal stela seems to specify a location which might have served as a center for the wood production activity, that is the seat of the Egyptian garrison at Ullaza.73 It is questionable whether this place should be recognized as the place designated later in this inscription as being set ‘upon the shore of Lebanon in the fortress . . . ’ (hr nmj [nt] Rnnn m nnw . . . ), also in connection with wood supply and processing.74 Yet more illuminative is an indication that this fortress was used as a “shipyard” for construction of ceremonial boats intended to be delivered to Egypt in their entirety (?).75 In such a stronghold the Egyptians could have implemented their experience in techniques of boats building in the Nile Valley for hundreds of years.76

Another long-acquired technique which was particularly vital for this operation pertains to the conveyance of the boats from the coast region to the Euphrates. This facet of the operation confronts us with the most challenging concern of the eighth campaign. Faulkner was probably right in assuming that the boats were transferred to the Euphrates disassembled.77 This is well in accord with our knowledge about methods of land transportation of boats employed in Egypt.78 Disassembled vessels could have been maneuvered over rough roads to their destination, more prudently than in one piece.79 Therefore, vessels’ components were pre-planned and produced to suit a potential conveyance, disarticulated, by way of land.80 This method was probably the most suitable for one of the prevalent
vehicles for boat transportation – ox-drawn carts. According to the Gebel Barkal stela, this was the method used for transporting the boats from the Mediterranean coast to the Euphrates.84 This method of boat transportation is known to have been used in Egypt prior to the time of Thutmose III.85 This means of transportation was used by the Asiatics themselves for the same purpose.86

All that made the knowledge, experience and resources required for boat construction and conveyance at hand. The boats could have been available within a relatively short notice, ready for transportation and use while the Egyptian army was on its way northward.87 In this sense the episode of crossing the Euphrates was not beyond expectations.

THE COURSE OF THE CAMPAIGN UP TO THE EUPHRATES

Next to the preparation phase, the second stage of the campaign is less comprehensible. The official sources do no allude at all to the trajectory taken by Thutmose III from the Lebanese coast towards the Euphrates. The Annals Inscription proceeds directly to the nucleus military operation at the region of the Euphrates, and all other sources focus on the main events while ignoring the preceding phase as well.

The only source that furnishes us with relevant data for this part of the campaign is the autobiography of Amenemheb. It is selective in details but seems to be trustworthy for studying the progress of the Egyptian army up to the Euphrates.

This inscription is highly valuable, for it defines the possible territorial range which had been reached by Thutmose III during the eighth campaign. However, the autobiography of Amenemheb had prompted an ongoing debate concerning the chronology of this campaign.88 The order of events as commemorated in his autobiography, as well as the location of various places he mentions are not securely recognized yet. Of the listed toponyms and occurrences comprising Amenemheb’s deeds only a few can securely be assigned to the eighth campaign.89 The skirmish in the land of ‘Sn-n-df’r’ 87 (probably situated on the Orontes River between Tunip and Nj),88 and military activity in Kadesh89 and the land of Takhy,89 plausibly ought to be assigned to another sequence of events.90

FROM THE LEBANESE COAST TO ALLEPO

Amenemheb’s recorded activity in the Negev region has been presumed to be a preliminary operation by the Egyptian army on the way northward.89 It chiefly relies on the temporal context in which it is recalled – Amenemheb presents three POW he had seized in the Negev to the king while he is already at Naharina.90 Although this notion has not been universally accepted,91 it retains the possibility that, if this action was actually part of the eighth campaign, it occurred while the king was already far in the North, taking action in the Orontes Valley,92 That would mean that at least part of the Egyptian army moved Northward by Land, along the Canaanite coast. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to argue that the majority of the Egyptian army was moving to its final destination by sea, up to Byblos, their preferable port-of-call in the Levant, and home away from home.93

From the Lebanese coast the campaign moved eastward, towards the Orontes Valley.94 Ullaza, which submitted to the Egyptians during Thutmose III’s seventh campaign, year 31,95 and had possibly been utilized as a workshop for the boats’ construction, could have served as a point of departure. In this case, the Naher el Kebir/Eleutheretos Valley was reasonably taken as a progression route.96 An eastward movement could be conducted more securely through the Mid-Upper Orontes valley, which leads directly into the heartland of the Syrian interior.

Sethe’s reconstruction of the toponym Qatna in the worn introduction of the narrative of the eighth Campaign in the Annals Inscription was discredited by Redford.97 Yet, a passage by Qatna cannot be dismissed on the whole. Qatna, a dominant palatial center of the Late Bronze Age situated north of Kadesh,98 was a pivotal station on a major route leading from the Mediterranean coast to the Middle Euphrates.99 This city is mentioned in the introduction to the section celebrating the eighth campaign on the seventh pylon. According to this line in the inscription, a passage is purportedly made through the ‘district’ of Qatna in the course of the eighth campaign.100 Following is an exceptional episode which occurred while Thutmose III seems to have interrupted the army’s advancement for testing the products of the local bow-making industry.101 Whether this should point at a sort of contractual arrangement between Thutmose III and Qatna by this time, enabling the Egyptians a safe passage through the city,102 ought to remain as a moot point.

From Qatna, one route branched out towards Mari and another one turned north/north-east towards Aleppo.103 The arrival of the Egyptian army at Aleppo is also implied by the autobiography of Amenemheb.104 After presenting his capture from the Negev to the king (already in Naharin),105 a sequence of additional captures made by Amenemheb is enumerated. The list of place names in which he repeatedly captured POW and spoils is intriguingly alluded to in regard to ‘this campaign’ (w’dft pr),107 possibly meaning along the route of the eighth campaign. First comes a place named kbst tš tš w’n hr mnnjt Hr-r-bw,108 This place was identified by Redford as a mountainous region called ‘the Juniper-Ridge’, situated west to Aleppo.105 There, deep in the Syrian interior, a violent encounter of unknown extent seem to have occurred.111

The character of the campaign up to this point is little vague. A portrayal of this phase of the campaign as a sequence of attacks, destructions and submissions of major political entities along its route has nothing to rely on in the sources. Moreover, the Egyptian army crossed the Syrian terrain passing the ‘district’ (w)
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of Qatna, with a possible visit to the city involved (in keeping with the bow-testing episode) and in the vicinity of Aleppo, i.e. ‘west’ of it. No real confrontation is referred to, neither any significant immediate consequences of the march of the Egyptian army in terms of military achievements. Therefore, we may reasonably assume that whatever the nature of the skirmish was, it did not exceed local encounters with the objectives of intimidation and replenishing of food stocks for the army.114 The way from Aleppo to the Euphrates was probably expected to be direct with minimum, or no interference at all from opposing parties.

FROM ALEPPO TO THE EUFRATES

The view that Carchemish is the site to be recognized as the meeting point of Thutmose III with the Euphrates has widely prevailed among scholars.115 There, it is assumed, occurred the most laudable episode of the eighth campaign, namely, the crossing of the Euphrates.

Carchemish gained its prominence starting at the mid-Third Millennium at the least and played an economic and political role in the Ancient Near East for more than two Millennia.116 This Millennium at the least and played an economic and political role in the Ancient Near East for more than two Millennia.117 This designator requires that the focus on Carchemish in the sources relating to the eighth campaign becomes dubious. This reference comes in the autobiography of Amenemheb, a clear demarcation between these two “Lands” is manifested by a passage from the Annals of the Muršili II. In this text, the border line between both “Lands” is identified as representing the ‘Land of Carchemish’.122

According to this text, the border line between both “Lands” ought to be sought for north of two pairing tells, situated on opposing banks of the Mid-Euphrates – Munbaqa on the east and Árūda or el-Ḥmūmar on the west, 10 km. south of Tell Hadidi.123 A slightly northward border line was suggested by Adamthwaite, who seeks to identify the northern settlement of the ‘Land of Aštata’ with tell el-Qitar, 15 km. north of Tell Hadidi, a possible location for a regional city also called Aštata.124 Be that as it may, a clear demarcation between these two “Lands” is manifested by a passage from the Annals of the Muršili II. In his raiding to the Mid-Euphrates region he first crossed the ‘Land of Carchemish’ and, subsequently, entered the city of Aštata and fortified it.125 A sense of immediate proximity between both regions is evident here. Accordingly, it is implied here that the territory of the ‘Land of Carchemish’ has reached the ‘Big Bend’ of the Euphrates.126

THE ‘LAND OF CARCHEMISH’:

IN SEARCH OF THUTMOSE III’S FINAL DESTINATION

Ironically, as far as the present writer is aware, the first attestation of the term ‘Land of Carchemish’ is in the autobiography of Amenemheb.

No clear indications are available concerning the nature and domain of this tract of land. Was it defined as a geographically demarcated region, regardless of the effectual political and administrative foothold of the rulers of Carchemish, or was it reliant on changeable historical circumstances? As for the second option, we may recall a bowl inscribed with an hieroglyphic inscription, ascribed to Horemheb, which bears the definition of the ‘Land of Carchemish’ as belonging to the ‘. . . vile chief of Carchemish’.118 Yet this item is alleged to be a modern forgery, and although the inscription engraved on it still retains a measure of authenticity in view of some scholars,119 it cannot be used as a reliable indication to the nature of the ‘Land of Carchemish’.

The sources dealing with the Euphrates region during the Middle Bronze Age do not provide us with a picture of the regional sub-divisions extant at this time. Carchemish is known to have been one of the leading forces in this region, both politically and economically, yet not of the first tier.120 However, it is not known whether the influence of Carchemish during this period was adequately effectual to demarcate a whole region. The vagueness of the sources is fading at the beginning of the Late Hittite Period, when the first attestations of the ‘Land of Carchemish’ appear. In the Sattiwaya treaty two lists of cities, granted by Suppiluliuma I to his son Piyaššili, are attributed to two different regions. The name of the first one is missing and the second region is named Aštata, the well documented region of the Mid-Euphrates.121 According to Hawkins, a city named Mazuwait in the first list is to be identified with Tell Aṭmar, in the vicinity of Carchemish. Hence, the first list should be identified as representing the ‘Land of Carchemish’.

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A sustainability of this division, starting well before the Late Hittite Period, is obliquely implied by more allusions from the time of of Muršili II. In ‘The deeds of Šuppiluliuma’ a clear differentiation is made between the town of Carchemish and the land of Carchemish.126 It is not completely clear whether this terminology was genuine for the time of Suppiluliuma I or anachronistic to it, after having come into use by the time of Muršili II.127 Yet, this possibility cannot be ruled out. In any event, the explicit use of the term ‘Land of Carchemish’ in the autobiography of Amenemheb is in and of itself an indication for a prolonged use, extending back to the 15th Century B.C.E. at the least.128

The apparent existence of a territory named ‘Land of Carchemish’ by the time of the eighth Campaign, allow us to redefine the region in which Thutmose III approached the Euphrates – not only Carchemish the town, but a tract of land extending for 100 km. or so southward.

Where, then, did Thutmose III reach the Euphrates? Scrutinizing the most crucial aspect of the eight campaign, namely the military activity, will provide us with preliminary indicators for an approximate location.

The Military Aspect of the Eighth Campaign at the Euphrates Region

Types of Egyptian Operations in the Region of the Euphrates

Whereas the nature of the military aspect of the eighth campaign en route to the Euphrates may not be very clear, the resulting events of the arrival at the river are more tangibly displayed in the sources. First, the Annals Inscription furnishes general statements about violent encounters, amounting to the destruction of the settlement infrastructure in the territory of Mitanni.

This action had brought, including setting fires, and destruction attained broader attention in the Gebel Barkal stela.130 Both stelae stress the amount of violence and plunder of settlements, it has more in common with the narrative of the first campaign its more fluent literary, less descriptive than the terse, sober style typifying the Day-Book report.131 It provides a strong impression of abusing, humiliating action from the side of the Egyptians. The way the pursuit episode is described portrays the Mitannians in the image of terrified wild animals in a hunting scene.132 It definitely recalls the description of the consequences of the battle at Megiddo during the first campaign.133 This fluent literary style is relatively exceptional in the Annals inscription, and its role should be examined suspiciously. It draws more to the domain of a literary sub-genre which focuses on the exploits and prowess of the king rather than an actual occurrence.

The narrative of the eighth campaign shares, therefore, with the narrative of the first campaign its more fluent literary, less realistic style. Yet, when it comes to the more strictly informed episodes, those which are believed to be more reliable, like destruction and plunder of settlements, it has more in common with the narratives of later campaigns.

In this situation, it is less probable that the occasion of the eighth campaign was aimed at a decisive set-piece battle with the ruler of Mitanni. It is more likely to perceive it as another ‘expedition chevauchées, as most of the later campaigns of Thutmose III were,135 of raids into remote territory without meaning of embarking on a pre-planned confrontation with a massively armed body. It is possible that the Egyptians might have overwhelmed the Mitannians by arriving without notice, while the ruler of Mitanni expecting them elsewhere, if he actually did at all.136 Be that as it may, the recorded description is in favor of a complete Egyptian control of the events.
This view, regarding the military conduct of Thutmose III while arriving at the Euphrates might be further sustained by scrutinizing the episode of the crossing of the Euphrates and related issues.

**THE PURPOSE AND MEANING OF THE CROSSING OF THE EUPHRATES IN LITERATURE AND REALITY**

It is by crossing the Euphrates that the eighth campaign turns into such a glorious achievement of Thutmose III. The crossing of the Euphrates was repeatedly celebrated in literature, and commemorated in numerous sources, both official and private.144

However, nothing in the sources points to the ultimate goal of this action. Most of the secondary sources allude to the crossing episode on its own merit.145 It is in the three major terms of this action. Most of the secondary sources allude to the crossing, we are informed there about other riverine activity coupled with it. According to the Annals Inscription, the chaotic flight of the Mitannians occurred while the Egyptian king was in pursuit of them in the following manner:

‘Then he [went] by skdhwt for ltrw-measure in pursuit of them…’ ([…]f ltrw n skdhwt m s.sn …).146

This phrase is telling, for it defines more closely the type of action taken at the river. Usually, the term skdhwt denotes a travel upon water.147 In this case, a measure of progression pertaining to the skdhwt motion is given – ltrw-measure. This measure is defined within a short-ranged distance,148 although this definition of the term, and its association with travel upon water, is disputed.149

Accepting the interpretation of the ltrw-measure as a strictly defined measure,150 we might look at the movement of the Egyptians upon the water as a tactically constructed maneuver, conducted within the confines of time and distance. A relatively short-term sailing recognized by the skdhwt-episode could have been used in order to speed up the movement of the Egyptian army in its pursuit after the fleeing Mitannians.

The notion of Egyptian intensive action upon the water of the Euphrates is further reinforced by the description of the preceding episode in the Annals Inscription. The destructive foray against settlements was taken by means of lhd movement, as the following phraseology shows:

‘Lo, his majesty proceeded lhd-ward, plundering the towns and razing the villages (lst lhd.n hmn.f br k.kl dmiw hr lbd wjyt …).151 The rendering of lhd, the key term in this episode, has become the focal point of a prolonged, thorny debate.152 This term was assigned two meanings when used out of its immediate context of Nile cruising: sailing downstream, as in its original rendering, and moving/proceeding northward, when regarded with proceeding by way of land.153

An agreed resolution pertaining to the proper rendering of the term lhd with regard to the eighth campaign is far from hand as well. Some scholars adhered to the original rendering of this expression, reconstructing the direction taken by the Egyptians in the eighth campaign as downstream on the Euphrates.154 On the other hand, the meaning of ‘northward’ is, sometimes clearly, attested in context of military campaigns outside Egypt.155 Yet, one passage in the Armant Stela provides us with an indication in favor of the meaning of ‘sailing downstream’ for lhd in context of the eighth campaign. Regarding the mode by which the destruction operation against the settlements of the region was carried out, the text reads as follows:

‘…when he had crossed the Euphrates, destroyed the towns on both its banks . . . ’ ([f]n.f ltrw phr-wr pupt.n.f dmiw gs.fj . . . ).156 Simultaneous destruction on both banks of the Euphrates has probably required efficiency from the side of the Egyptians. Preferably, moving by boats down the Euphrates – the easiest navigation option in these circumstances, could have provided the optimal choice for fulfilling a task or operation aimed at being taken on both banks of the Euphrates.157 A lhd-movement, therefore, should denote in this case a progression upon the water and not a general indicator of direction.158 The association of the term lhd with the skdhwt episode reinforce the notion of applying the meaning of ‘sailing downstream’ to this term in the case of the eighth campaign. Finally, a word should be said about the navigation feasibilities on the Euphrates regarding its current. In-detail description delivered by Herodotus illuminates the constraints dictating a downstream sailing along the Euphrates.159 Although downstream direction is not necessarily exclusive for navigation purpose along this river160 it, nevertheless, supports the attribution of the meaning of ‘sailing downstream’ to lhd in the context of the eighth campaign.

Another crucial aspect of evaluating the mode of operation taken at the Euphrates is found in the issue of the boats. These boats are assumed to be the vehicles for transporting the Egyptian army to the other bank of the Euphrates. As such, the type of boat we would expect is the most suitable for this purpose in terms of assemblage efficiency, carrying capacity and cruising qualities required for maneuvering forces at the shortest time and range. Most of all, some kind of fording rafts were probably ideal for this purpose. Alas, only in later periods we do hear about crossing the Euphrates by means of light rafts and fixed links made of pontoon bridges. These means are not known to have been used in the Late Bronze Age.161 Contrary, the boats built on the Lebanese coast are known by their appellation only, and termed as ’f’w-boats.162 This term is a sort of generic appellation for one of the most prevalent types of Egyptian boats used in Egypt, also used for riverine and maritime battles.163

The main problem posed by this designation is our inability to define the precise function specified for the ’f’w-boats in the Euphrates.
context of the eighth campaign. A predesigned function of transferring troops across the Euphrates is to be questioned, for we lack the following required data to recognize these boats as ideal for this purpose:

1. The type of these boats, their size, capacity and number.
2. The size of the Egyptian force, seemingly aimed at being transported across the Euphrates.
3. The compliance of the factors pertaining to the boats use and construction with the supposed demands of the crossing mission.

Presumably, "haw-"boats were not the smallest of the Egyptians' vessels. Furthermore, we cannot tell how ideal this type of boat was for use as a transporting platform. In addition, we lack evidence for the logistical considerations which played a role in the conveyance of the boats from the Lebanese coast to the Euphrates. We cannot tell what was a reasonable number of boats to be hauled from the Lebanese coast for hundreds of kilometers, without significantly disrupting the pace of progression and safety of the army through the hostile terrain. How complicated they were to be dragged and assembled is another unresolved problem.

Naturally, these considerations will remain dubious as long as no clear estimation of the extent of the Egyptian forces on the eighth campaign is at hand. The suggested estimations for the size of Egyptian expeditionary forces are not necessarily of use regarding the eighth campaign because of its unique, one-time nature. Was there a need for massively recruited, organized troops or, contrary, more lightly composed contingents, better suitable for rapid movement and less liable to constraints derived from the campaign's distinctiveness?

Combining these ponderings with the available information obtained from the written sources, we may arrive at the following assumption: surmising a vast conveyance of "haw-"boats across the Syrian desert, which aims at meeting the needs of transporting a considerable army across the Euphrates to the Mitannian territory, is less convincing than perceiving a careful use of them, focusing on aggressive action upon a certain segment of the Euphrates flow.

In fact, nothing in the sources hints at an objective of reaching the Euphrates other than acting within the confines of the river valley. The intention of extending the range of the Egyptian expedition into the realm beyond the eastern bank, deep into the Mitannian territories, is not explicitly addressed. Crossing the Euphrates was no more than the means of focusing on aggressive action upon a certain segment of the Euphrates flow.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AROUND THE EUPHRATES

The most prominent feature of the pursuit after the ruler of Mitanni and his men is a sense of complete defeat without fight. The ruler of Mitanni escaped to kj t1 = ‘another land’, probably a faraway district or dependency of Mitanni. His nobles found refuge in caves.

Capability of defeating without fight is one of the crucial components in the ideological manifestation of the personality of the Egyptian king. The appearance of the king on the battlefield, as in the battle of Megiddo, and the resultant fear and terror are sufficient to suppress the enemy’s spirits in the blink of an eye. This perception is of no help for any attempt to realize the eventual outcome of the confrontation in the eighth campaign. The only other data we are left with, which can assist us to estimate the intensity of the confrontation, are the numbers of the men and women captured during this campaign.

The numbers are insufficiently specified as 3 rulers, 30 of their wives, 80 men who were captured with them, 606 male and female servants and their children and an unpreserved number of those who surrendered (hapy). The count of the rulers and their wives as 3+30 suspiciously evokes the number of the Asiatic allies who converged at Megiddo in order to confront Thutmose III: 330. This number evokes suspicion for its authenticity and was perhaps regarded as a symbolic multiplicity of 'tens and hundreds'. Accordingly, the 3+30 captured rulers and their wives in the eighth campaign might assigned symbolic connotation as well. When the account of the eighth campaign comes to more realistic numbers the overall view is less
impressive. The occupations of prisoners are of no military-oriented character. 80 "men (rmt) who were captured could have been no more than the retinue of the captured rulers. 179 The surrendered people (hppw) are those who have submitted themselves without fight. 180 No mention is made of POW, or any specified capture of weaponry or the like, so crucial to declare a triumph in battle field. 181 Lack of evidence for involvement of martial components in the conclusion of this section of the campaign is in striking contrast to the conclusion of the other campaigns of Thutmose III. 182

The relative paucity of individuals captured by the Egyptians during the eighth campaign has not evaded commentators' eyes. Consequently, some of them have already argued for a reduced scale of the original objective of the eighth campaign. 183 This observation led them to perceive this campaign as a long-range raid and not a venture aimed at full battlefield confrontation with the ruler of Mitanni.

The results of the examination of the data pertaining to the confrontation between the Egyptians and the Mitannian forces, coupled with the analysis of the crossing episode, allow us now to turn to the crucial task of locating the geographical setting of Thutmose III's activity around the Euphrates.

THE LOCATION OF THUTMOSE III'S ACTIVITY AROUND THE EUPHRATES RIVER

Summing up the analysis of the military activity, we may underscore the following key points:

1. No substantial confrontation between the Egyptians and the Mitannians is reported.
2. The activity of the Egyptians is attached to the Euphrates Valley, with no clear indication of a further penetration into the territories east of the Euphrates. Part of the Egyptian activity was taken upon the water.
3. The main target of the Egyptian activity at this stage of the eighth campaign was the settlement infrastructure of a certain segment of the Euphrates Valley, composed of towns and rural settlements.
4. The consequences of the Egyptian activity around the Euphrates were reflected in the civilian component of that specific region.

In and of itself, the Egyptian narrative of the eighth campaign is inadequate in identifiable markers in regard with the location of the arena in which these events took place. In contrast, the merit of the written sources is considerably enhanced by integrating the information they provide with a complementary field of research, namely archaeology. In recent decades, the region extending from Carchemish to Emar and formerly known as 'Land of Carchemish', the only geographical definition for the region in which Thutmose III acted, has received extended archaeological treatment due to the construction projects for dams constructed on the Euphrates. 184

The consequences of the Egyptian activity around the Euphrates, in search of the final destination of the eighth campaign. This analysis ought to be considered as preliminary, but, nonetheless, exhibits a potential base for further multi-disciplinary study of the eighth campaign.

THUTMOSE III IN THE EUPHRATES – A SYNTHESIS

A. Settlement Types

Recalling the types of localities mentioned in the texts which fell victim to the assaults of the Egyptian army, "towns" and "villages", a curious consistency arises with the situation reflected in the archaeological work in the Mid-Euphrates region. The dispersal of urban settlements along this section of the Euphrates within the agricultural hinterland coincides with the picture emerging from the Egyptian textual evidence. This pattern of the settled zone along the Mid-Euphrates was the result of a geopolitical transformation of the region by the end of the Middle Bronze Age, prior to the time of Thutmose III. The region south of Carchemish, down to Emar, the so-called 'Big Bend' of the Euphrates, which was dominated during the Middle Bronze Age by the kingdom of Khana, has been disintegrated and declined in terms of population density. Consequently, this region became relatively marginal to the rising superpowers, Mitanni, Assyria and Kassite Babylon, a kind of no-man's-land at least down to Emar while from Emar down to Babylon no significant urban center was extant. 185

The devolution of the settlement density along the Mid-Euphrates is also attested in abandonment of Tell sites in favor of dispersed rural communities at the river's confluence with the Balikh. 186

Along the valley bed of the Mid-Euphrates this tendency of settlement reduction is evinced in a twofold manner. First, major Tell sites of the region, flourishing during the Early Bronze Age 187 and Middle Bronze Age periods, 188 ceased to exist in the Late Bronze Age. 189 Those sites, gave way to a new type of settlement – mid-sized urban centers, some of them resting on Early Bronze Age / Middle Bronze Age foundations, now fortified. These sites had no elite palatial properties familiar from
the western and coastal regions of Syria.\textsuperscript{194} This new appearance of the settlement landscape of the Mid-Euphrates is explicitly reflected in sites such as Tell Bazi,\textsuperscript{195} Tell Hadidi,\textsuperscript{196} Tell Munbaqa\textsuperscript{197} and some others.\textsuperscript{198} They were embedded within the irrigated agricultural infrastructure of the Mid-Euphrates valley, which provided the subsistence for the region,\textsuperscript{199} and can feasibly be identified with the "towns" attacked by Thutmose III.

Contrary, the archaeological data yielded from the immediate vicinity of Carchemish seem to contradict the information obtained from the Egyptian sources. Most revealing in this context are the results of the surveys in the region extending 60 km. north of Carchemish, up to present day Turkish Birecik. Comparing to the settlement affluence in this region by the transitional Early Bronze/Middle Bronze phase,\textsuperscript{200} it has experienced a sheer decline in population density during the Late Bronze Age. By that time the area surrounding Carchemish was primarily dotted by Tell-type settlements and sites on hill tops. Those Tell sites, possibly down to Tell Ahmar, seem to have been affiliated with the socio-political orbit of Carchemish, the significant hub of the region at that time. There is no evidence for a contemporaneous significant array of dispersed rural settlements around Carchemish.\textsuperscript{201}

B. Settlement Array

Another feature of the archaeological reality along the Mid-Euphrates which might correspond to a noticeable facet of the Egyptian activity around the Euphrates is the phenomenon of "paired cities".\textsuperscript{202} It may assist in clarifying the rationale behind the Egyptian mode of operation in the Euphrates region, on both banks of the river. Opposing Tell sites, from both sides of the Euphrates river, served as paired fortified strongholds. This new pattern of settlement along the Mid-Euphrates has been resulted from the process of collapse and diminution of Middle Bronze Age settlements and transformation of segments of the population into a "dimorphic" way of life, due to a process of nomadization of the region.\textsuperscript{203}

These paired sites aimed at guarding strategic crossing points of east-west routes, linking the Jazirah and the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{204} These sites were also aligned with the north-south traffic route between Carchemish and Mari, which came into use by the 18th century B.C.E. when grain trade with Mari was extensive.\textsuperscript{205}

Strategically located, these sites, and their rural environs, developed into a cultural melting pot, primarily based on West-Semitic culture foundations. This cultural trend is manifested in art and material culture,\textsuperscript{206} as well as in linguistic traits.\textsuperscript{207} Their position in the Mid-Euphrates region, bridging the West-Semitic realm of the Levant with the nuclear Hurrian cultural sphere, made their environs an ideal scene for the colliding, overlapping interests of the major superpowers of the era in which loyalties and hegemonies were changing hands, from Mittanian to Hittite to Assyrian.\textsuperscript{208}

Thutmose III could also find interest in showing up in this region out of this very reason. In this manner the Egyptian activity around the Euphrates can be conceived as focusing on attacking a crucial geopolitical link between Mittani and the West-Semitic realm but not as a direct offence against Mittani’s homeland.

However, any attempt to attribute destruction layers in major tell sites in the region, such as Tell Munbaqa,\textsuperscript{209} to the military activity of Thutmose III around the Euphrates ought, for the moment, to remain tentative. It can only be verified, if at all, by discussing this issue in a wider historical context.

C. Access Routes and Ways

Reliance upon access routes from Aleppo to the Euphrates through the Syrian steppe must also be considered. We are well aware of the complex road system connecting the Mediterranean and upper Mesopotamia crossing the region of Carchemish.\textsuperscript{210} One of the major routes leading from Aleppo to the Euphrates, already known from the Mari archive, turned northeast through Bab and Membij and reached the Euphrates near the assumed location of the fortress town Ṿaṭīr šāmūt Epuh, opposite Tell Ahmar about 20 km. south of Carchemish.\textsuperscript{211} This route may well have served Thutmose III in the eight campaign if he had meant to reach the vicinity of Carchemish. Yet, this route could pose a problem concerning the most crucial facet of the eighth campaign – its logistical endeavor, regarding the mode and pace of the advancement of the Egyptian army.

Redford’s estimation of 15 km. per day for 30 days of march up to the Euphrates\textsuperscript{212} poses an unprecedented challenge for the Egyptians in this campaign. This time, the Egyptians were not dealing with easily accessed destinations, targeted along the Lebanese coast, or in its proximity. The eighth campaign dictated a sheer divergence of the accustomed tactical moves and logistic demands utilized in most later campaigns. The problem of boat conveyance to the Euphrates was probably a major component in this new challenge. In his War in Ancient Egypt, Spalinger calculated the velocity of the oxen movement and the food required to nourish them along the route. He indicated the inevitable slow rate of the line, regarding the factors dictating a moderate pace,\textsuperscript{213} although the progression rate might vary from a few km. per day up to 24 kilometers, covered by 6 hours march per day.\textsuperscript{214}

Therefore, conducting this section of the campaign could have been slower, taking into consideration the particular circumstances of the march. In terms of food and liquid supply for the Egyptian army the toll of this campaign could have exceeded the regular demands experienced during other campaigns along the coastal region. This situation could have encumbered the progress and limited the range of options for military activity. In this regard we may ask whether the evidence of Amenemheb about violent clashes actually means intensive
attacks on large cities and wide-ranging encounters in battlefield or coincidental actions en route to the Euphrates, the main objective of the eighth campaign.

Well into the Syrian interior, the Egyptian army was detached from its major logistic centers in harbors and other strongholds, used as a source of nourishment for its campaign.211 Compared to the logistical needs for the 10-day crossing of the Egyptian army from Sile to Gaza, on the occasion of the first campaign,212 the difficulties for the Egyptian army’s advance towards the Euphrates were enormously bigger. The growing distance from supply centers and the need to nourish the beasts of burden, coupled with the rather barren terrain – in and of itself a deterring impediment for any military body of a considerable size – made this part of the eighth campaign a different kind of venture. In these circumstances, a shorter, direct and uninterrupted advancement of the Egyptian army up to the Euphrates is a more reasonable scenario.

Therefore, alternative routes connecting Aleppo with the Euphrates, other than the Aleppo-Carchemish route, should be considered. The Euphrates was also accessible by routes ramified from the region of Aleppo eastward and southeastward. These routes would have been more advantageous for the Egyptians in terms of travel efficiency, better than appending a considerable segment of journey up to Carchemish.

A major route turned from Aleppo southeastward, towards Emār or its vicinity, a point where the route turned south again, and led along the Euphrates towards Mari and Babylon.213 Once this route departed Aleppo, it split into two sub-branches. The first one extended southward via Sefire, bypassing the Jabbul Lake on its south towards Emār. The second one extended from Aleppo eastward, crossing the Jabbul Plain north of Umm el-Marra and then turn southward to Emār.214

Although we cannot entirely preclude the possibility of arriving at Emār, reaching this city, or it environs, would have led the Egyptians exceedingly south. This possibility is less conceivable also with regard to a relative sparseness of settlements around this city, which contradicts the profusion of settlements in the area in which Thutmose III acted, according to the Egyptian sources.215 Moving eastward from Umm el-Marra, where the original northern sub-branch of the Aleppo-Emār route turned south towards Emār, might preferably be considered as the route taken by Thutmose III.

Using this route was more likely, for it provided the shortest convenient path towards the Euphrates, mere 35 km. with no significant settlement to oppose on the way, directly into the densely settled segment of the Mid-Euphrates extending along the northern half of the ‘Big Bend’.216 This route crossed a relatively barren terrain, an arid zone in which the typical reduction in the amount of Late Bronze Age settlements was experienced.217 Umm el-Marra was the only surviving urban site in the plain, a mid-point between the agricultural zone extending to the west towards Aleppo and the arid zone which extended eastward, towards the Euphrates. In the 15th Century it only echoed its former heyday, diminished in size and focusing on agriculture as a basic component of its economy.218 This site, and its environs, could ideally have served the Egyptians as a stopover for replenishment before moving on to the last segment of the march towards the Euphrates.

Taking this route towards the ‘Big Bend’ of the Euphrates would still have brought the Egyptians into the southern limits of the ‘land of Carchemish’, even without advancing considerably further northward.

However, two reservations should be taken in this regard. The first one concerns with the political situation in the Jabbul Plain by the time of the eighth campaign. Umm el-Marra was evidently under the control of Mittanni to some extent.219 Yet, we cannot tell how firm was the Mittannian foothold in this region by the time of Thutmose III. The synchronism of Egyptian and Ancient Near Eastern chronologies in the 15th Century B.C.E. is still uncertain. It is possible that a temporary weakness in the influence of Mittanni west of the Mid-Euphrates was advantageous to the Egyptians by that time. The second reservation concerns with the logistical constrains of the march. Considering the fact that animal-drawn carts should have traveled upon paved roads for safety of the journey,220 we may suspect the competence of a probably marginal route to meet the special needs of the intricate march of the Egyptian army. This problem might be resolved by assuming that this route was fairly reasonable in terms of quality, although secondary in relation to the main branches of the routes leading from Aleppo to the Euphrates.

Finally, the issue of the crossing of the Euphrates should be referred to here again, in context of the access routes. Contrary to the prevalent view about the role played by the major fording sites of the Euphrates in the eighth campaign, it must be kept in our mind that other options were available for the Thutmose III along the Euphrates. In order to launch the boats into the water it was sufficient to use one of the secondary crossing points which were used alongside the major ones in the vicinity of Carchemish and Emār.221 Therefore, the possibility that Thutmose III could have met the Euphrates in other part than the purported meeting points at Carchemish and Emār should not be precluded just on account of absence of ideal crossing sites.

D. The Environs of the Egyptian Activity in the Eighth Campaign and the Elite Structure of the Mid-Euphrates Region.

A highly tentative matching point between the results of the archaeological investigation along the Mid-Euphrates and the Egyptian sources might be found in a seemingly pointless detail incorporated within the description of the consequences of the Egyptian operation around the Euphrates. Heading the list of captives in this campaign are 3 (foreign) rulers + 30 of their...
Bronze Age Sites have been found purged of any dominant correlation can enhance the notion of the Mid-Euphrates valley than in other pronounced palatial centers in the Levant. This government headed by a ruler, but of less power and authority with the historical data, pertaining to the formation of local palatial component, it may be reasonable to imply a consistency attested in the archives of Mari, 227 and at the beginning of the early Second Millennium B.C., the feasibility of using the number of 3+30 rulers and their wives in order to stress the abstract idea of multiplicity matches a sustainable governmental system, typical to the local political system of the Mid-Euphrates region. This system was characterized by a substantial body of town-people who comprised a sort of a local municipal council, officially subjected to a local ruler but of no less applicable prerogatives. These appointees were called ‘Elders’, ‘Brothers’ or ‘Great Ones’ and are known primarily from the time of Late Hittite Emar.226 Nonetheless, the origin of this system goes back in time up to the late Third Millennium B.C., as attested in the archives from Ebla, down through the early Second Millennium B.C., mainly attested in the archives of Mari,227 and at the beginning of the Late Bronze Age at key sites of the Mid-Euphrates such as Tell Hadidi and Tell Munbaqa/Ekalte.228

Recalling the fact that many of the Mid-Euphrates Late Bronze Age Sites have been found purged of any dominant palatial component, it may be reasonable to imply a consistency with the historical data, pertaining to the formation of local government headed by a ruler, but of less power and authority than in other pronounced palatial centers in the Levant. This corollation can enhance the notion of the Mid-Euphrates valley as the objective of Thutmose III in his eighth campaign but, still, is a matter of conjecture.

**THE BROADER HISTORICAL CONTEXT: A FEW REMARKS IN FAVOR OF THE MID-EUPHRATES**

The section in the Gebel Barkal Stela which is reminiscent of the eighth campaign acclaims the act of destruction cast upon various towns and villages in detail, using the habitual hyperboles for this kind of royal inscription.229 Yet, one statement, towards the end of this section, appears to indicate a concealed reality behind this lauding phraseology:

‘(and so) their districts, they belong to (anyone) who would make an appropriation for himself (¿), after my majesty destroyed them’ (ww.sn wn.sn n [wšl nf šsbk n sn wm.f]).230

This statement can be taken as reflecting a situation prevalent in the Mid-Euphrates region which, fortunately, can be relied on factual evidence. More than a few settlements situated along the Mid-Euphrates have retained textual and archaeological evidence for a political inclination towards the Mitannian sphere of influence.231 However, as mentioned above, this region is also known for its political instability during the Late Bronze Age, which took the form of shifting alliances and changing hegemonies. Noticeable within all the upheavals is, definitely, the take-over of this region by the Hittites in the 14th Century B.C.E. However, political and military agitation was prevalent in this region during the early phases of the Late Bronze Age as well.

As with other aspects of the discussion about the eighth campaign, a thorough analysis of the sources and evidence for this situation are beyond the scope of this paper. It may suffice to comment here with only a few general remarks. All three superpowers – Egypt, Hatti and Mitanni, played a role in shaping the international scene of the Levant starting at the beginning of the 15th century B.C.E. Still, this century is a kind of a “Dark Age,” in terms of written sources. Compared with the available information we have from the time of the Late Hittite empire, from the 14th Century onward, there is no corpus of documents which illuminate the developments in the field of international relations for the preceding century. Thus, any attempt to clearly acknowledge the geopolitical circumstances in which Thutmose III had embarked on his eighth campaign is doomed to failure. Nevertheless, a meticulous scrutiny of the available sources, mostly evoking relevant events in directly, can bring us to a better understanding of the political system and circumstances in which the eighth campaign was conducted.232

The results of this kind of study can furnish us with better understanding of the role played by the Mid-Euphrates region as a scene of activity and involvement for various powers, to which the eighth campaign of Thutmose III could reasonably have been directed as well, within the international cauldron of that time. This aspect, as stated, should be taken on its own merit.

Having tentatively suggested an undefined segment of the Mid-Euphrates south of Carchemish as the targeted scene for the activity of Thutmose III in his eighth campaign, we may turn to look for the rationale prompting the arrival at this region from a strategic point of view. Trade routes crossing this land were probably out of reach of Egyptian direct control, as much as it might seem attractive for a superpower such as Egypt. What, then, was Thutmose III aiming at by arriving in this remote district, removed from the core centers of the kingdom of Mitanni? A possible answer might be found in the most declarative aspect of this campaign, namely that of the stelae.
THE PROBLEM OF THE STELAE

THE TEXTUAL EVIDENCE

The Annals Inscription clarifies that one of the most significant acts Thutmose III executed in conjunction with the crossing of the Euphrates is the setting of a stela alongside a stela left at a certain site by his grandfather, Thutmose I. This episode is incorporated directly after the setting paragraph which opens the narrative of the eighth campaign, associated with the main events of the military activity at this stage of the campaign.

The syntactic role of each of these clauses is hard to define. There is no consensus as to which of these clauses is initial, indicative or subordinated. The key problem here is with clause no. 2, which refers to the positioning of the stela. It opens with a bare, initial construction that can define this clause as an independent one, emphasizing one of its objects or a subordinated one. Accordingly, different translations have been proposed in regard to the location of the stela and the timing of its setting. The following situations are the product of the referred translations:

1. On the west bank of the Euphrates, prior to the crossing.
2. On the east bank of the Euphrates, after the crossing and before the destruction campaign.
3. On the east bank of the Euphrates, after the crossing and the destruction campaign.

Each of these suggestions is based on the assumption that Thutmose III established one stela, that is, beside his grandfather’s, an idea that has attained wide acceptance. This notion makes no solution absolute, and leaves each one of them open to debate.

Another piece of evidence in this context is a passage from the Gebel Barkal stela which has become a pivotal point of the debate. It reads as follows:

Thereupon my majesty set up my stela on that mountain of Naharina, (made of) a block quarried from the mountain on the west side of the Great Bender (sDm.f construction, a clear indication for continuity along a sequence of events). In the Armant stela the sDm.f construction is used for the stela episode, imparting a sense of simultaneous occurrence together with the destruction activity. Still, even here it occurs after the crossing of the Euphrates. This sequence of events has prompted Redford to underscore the inherent inconsistency which pervades the main sources regarding the position of the stela episode. In his translation of the Annals Inscription, he positioned the setting of the stela before the crossing of the Euphrates. Elsewhere in his exemplary treatment of Thutmose III’s campaigns he contemplated an alternative reading, in a way that would bring the Annals report into conformity with the Armant and Gebel Barkal stelae.

Eventually, Redford chose to maintain his original rendering of the narrative in the Annals Inscription. He argued for the reliability of the Day-Book report, the core of the Annals Inscription, and stressed its tendency to keep the original chronological order of events, whereas the encomia, a propagandistic genre of royal eulogies into which the Gebel Barkal and Armant stelae fit, are not expected to maintain a genuine sequence of events. Yet, this tendency cannot be universally applied to any encomia composition without and erected elsewhere. Gardiner was the first who suggested that this stela was cut on the west bank, intended for erection on the east bank of the Euphrates. Helck adopted this view and elaborated upon it. He stressed the use of the demonstrative pf – ‘that (yonder)’ to define the place where the stela was established. In his view, this wording was made to differentiate between the “here”, the place of its extraction and the “there”, the place of the stela’s eventual setting. Accordingly agreed that the east bank was the final destination of the stela.

According to the Gebel Barkal stela, the setting of a stela by Thutmose III occurred at the end of the following sequence of events:

1. Crossing of the Euphrates.
2. Pursuit after the enemies.
3. Escape of the ruler of Mitanni to ‘another land’.
4. Erection of a stela.

Moreover, the Armant stela gives the same order of events:

1. Crossing the Euphrates.
2. Destruction of settlements.
3. Erection of a stela.

The authenticity of this sequence of events is further corroborated by the syntactic structure used for these passages. The episode of setting a stela is delivered in the Gebel Barkal stela by the sDm.f construction, a clear indication for continuity along a sequence of events. In the Armant stela the sDm.f construction is used for the stela episode, imparting a sense of simultaneous occurrence together with the destruction activity. Still, even here it occurs after the crossing of the Euphrates. This sequence of events has prompted Redford to underscore the inherent inconsistency which pervades the main sources regarding the position of the stela episode. In his translation of the Annals Inscription, he positioned the setting of the stela before the crossing of the Euphrates. Elsewhere in his exemplary treatment of Thutmose III’s campaigns he contemplated an alternative reading, in a way that would bring the Annals report into conformity with the Armant and Gebel Barkal stelae.

Discerning the stela mentioned here as a free-standing monument raises the possibility that this stela had been extracted at a given site, yet was intended to be transported to,
exception. Eulogies could have reversed order of main episodes from a given period but retain the internal order of each one of them, in reliance on the Day Book report. From the textual point of view, therefore, the problem of chronology regarding the setting of this stela remains unsettled.

However, a different approach to this entanglement which might provide the key for its solution is to be found in the Annals Inscription. Scrutinizing the narrative of the eighth campaign reveals a twofold mention of a stela set by Thutmose III. Allusion to a second stela in the Annals Inscription, directly before Thutmose III's return to Egypt takes place, has already been made. Redford suggested it was the one and the same stela which was established by Thutmose III alongside his grandfather's.256 Spalinger identified it as a stela of victory set in the land of Nij,257 and Lund merely incorporated a mention of it within the inventory of events during the eighth campaign.258

However, the position of this second allusion in the Annals Inscription is well in accord with the sequence of events recorded in both the Gebel Barkal and Armant stelae (above). The Annals Inscription provides us with the following order of events:

1. Crossing the Euphrates. Setting a stela on one of its banks and destruction of cities in the territory of Mitanni269
2. Pursuit after the defeated enemies260
3. Listing of spoil taken during the violent encounter with the enemies261
4. A reference to an act of destruction (the place name was not preserved)262
5. Setting a stela and arrival at Nj on the way back from the Euphrates263

All three sources refer to the setting of a stela in one of the later phases of the campaign. None of the them make the association of this allusion with a stela of Thutmose I. Actually, the exception is the reference to the stela set by Thutmose III next to his grandfather's, at the beginning of the Annals report. As a reference to the setting of a stela at the end of the campaign is repeated thrice, it enhances the probability that this timing is authentic, and that it reflects historical reality. This assumption might lead us to the following assertion: during his eighth campaign Thutmose III had not one, but two stelae established. The first one was established at the beginning of, or just before the progress along the Euphrates, that is the one he erected besides his grandfather's, while the other one was erected in proximity to its conclusion.

In this regard attention must be paid to a peculiar means of discernment between two stelae, used in the Annals Inscription. The stela of Thutmose III associated with the one of his grandfather refers to it by the adjective 'another' (kj).244 The 'otherness' of the stela of Thutmose III purportedly signifies its role as a counterpart of the stela of Thutmose I. It is not clear why no use of the recognizable term wD, standing for 'stela', was made here. Using the adjective kj in this context might cause the stela of Thutmose III to be sensed as secondary in relation to the adjacent original stela of Thutmose I.245 Therefore, we cannot dismiss an alternative interpretation, according to which, using Redford's terminology,266 the adjective kj does bear a proleptic quality but in relation to a second stela of Thutmose III set in this campaign, and not to the one of Thutmose I. A sense of lessered significance could be better understood in relation to a different stela of Thutmose III himself, which carried more meaningful implication than the one erected by the side of his grandfather's. By the time the Annals Inscription was composed, after year 42, the eighth campaign was nearly ten years behind, a time span which retrospectively could have been sufficient to solidify the hierarchy of the king's achievements, albeit in a slightly textually distorted manner.

However, this apparent absurdity is clearly settled in the Annals Inscription. Whereas the episode of setting a stela at the beginning of the narrative is treated as a mere factual event, the second mention of a stela, at a later stage of the campaign in the territory of Mitanni, explicitly provides us with the circumstances of its setting. Thutmose III arrives at Nj on his way back south, '. . . after having set his stela in Naharina, extending the borders of Egypt . . .' (smwn.f wD.f m Nhrnḥr xsws Kmt).267 Setting a stela next to a formerly established one by Thutmose I could, at best, compare the achievement of Thutmose III to that of his grandfather. By all logic, and parameters of ideology, only a second stela could have provided a sense of accomplishment which overshadows the achievements of former rulers, in this case of Thutmose I. This notion, about the establishment of two stelae by Thutmose III, first one next to the one of his grandfather and second one in a distance, can be further seen through reexamining the military facet of both campaigns towards the Euphrates, those of Thutmose I and Thutmose III.

TACTICAL AND MARTIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND A SUGGESTED LOCATION OF THE STELA OF THUTMOSE I

The main hurdle in Helck's interpretation, of locating the paired stelae of both Thutmoseids on the east bank of the Euphrates concerns our present knowledge about the achievement of Thutmose I in his campaign against Mitanni. Regrettably, we have no firm evidence for the arrival of Thutmose I at the Euphrates other than the mention of his stela by Thutmose III in the Annals Inscription.270 All other attestations are indirect and circumstantial.270 The only alleged reference to the Euphrates by Thutmose I was found to be ambiguous, as it probably refers to a body of water in Nubia or Egypt itself.270 For the moment, we cannot determine whether Thutmose I reached the west bank of the Euphrates, crossed it to its eastern bank, and, if he did, whether he moved further from

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the crossing point into the territory of Mitanni. The whereabouts of the activity conducted by Thutmose I in his Asiatic campaign, and his deeds there, should, therefore, exclusively rely on the reports of his officers from el-Kab.

The testimony of Ahmose son of Abana and Ahmose Pennekheb mention the arrival of Thutmose I at the land of Naharina. Yet, no mention of crossing the Euphrates eastward is provided with regard to the Asiatic campaign of Thutmose I. Had he ever crossed the Euphrates, it would have caused his officers to commemorate this act of valor in their autobiographies, the same way their later fellows, who were at the service of Thutmose III, did in their memoirs. Consequently, we may vacillate over the convention concerning the arrival of Thutmose I at the Euphrates as the objective, or consequence, of his Asiatic campaign.

As had been suggested above, the substance of the military activity of Thutmose III in the vicinity of the Euphrates was a riverine one, focusing on destruction of settlements along the banks of the river. Contrary, Thutmose I seems to have engaged in open battle with an undefined Mittanian force, conducting a skirmish of some extent, including the apparent use of war chariots. Thutmose III took live prisoners of civilian sectors while no members of the Mitannian armed forces are enumerated among them. Ahmose son of Abana, on the other hand, reports a 'Great Slaughter' inflicted upon the Mitannian foe. As hyperbolic as it might sound, this wording is validated by a mention of 21 (cut) hands presented by Ahmose Pennekheb to his king, Thutmose I. The Mitannian force confronted by Thutmose III is fleeing with no sign of resistance. Contrary, Thutmose I finds the Mitannians foe while he is in a process of 'gathering troops' (Iššušk). Absence of tactical moves and violent clashes in the battlefield from the narrative of the eighth campaign of Thutmose III can be explained by the topography of the scene in which the parties engaged. Acting along the Euphrates' flow would have meant an operation within the confines of the Euphrates valley, bounded between the escarpments of the desert plateau. Such a geographically restricted scene was not ideal for a set-piece battle of considerable forces. Haphazard to a certain extent, the kind of terrain has the potential of becoming a death trap to a cumbersome body of troops in certain conditions. Therefore, it is this observation which, actually, precludes the option of locating the place of confrontation between Thutmose I and the Mitannians in the immediate vicinity of the Euphrates.

The violent clash of the kind portrayed in the sources from the time of Thutmose I, would, logically have taken place in the open. Since nothing in the sources from the time of Thutmose I hints at a venture which resulted in the crossing of the Euphrates, or even at activity taken along its course, the remaining reasonable option is to identify the place of confrontation somewhere in the western hinterland of the Euphrates valley, between Aleppo, Nij and the Euphrates valley. The problem remains with the reference to the name Naharina. As it purportedly designated the core land of Mitanni, its use in the present context raises difficulty, as, to my view, Thutmose I obtained his achievement west of the Euphrates. A reasonable solution to this hindrance might be found in attributing to this term the meaning of the 'extended land of Naharina', including territories controlled by Mitanni west of the Euphrates. In any case, further scrutiny of this issue is needed.

For the moment, the above observation is sufficient to betray the general layout of Thutmose I's activity and, following, a sensible delineation of the vicinity in which his stela could have been established. Here, it must also be noted that a mention of the stela of Thutmose I in the Annals Inscription in conjugation with the crossing of the Euphrates does not necessarily mean immediate temporal juxtaposition. All the text provides us with is a sequence of events, which could have occurred in different times and considerable distance from each other.

A stela as such, could have been carved, or erected, anywhere within the bound of the area in which he conducted his campaign: west of the Euphrates, in a range that cannot be defined, removed from concentrations of settlements. Perhaps it was in proximity to a crossroad, on the surface of an easily accessible coincidental rock formation, just like his familiar stela in Upper Nubia at Hagar el Merwa.
A suggested location for the stela of Thutmose III

Accepting the above suggested scenario of the existence of two stelae made by order of Thutmose III during the eighth campaign, we may turn to speculate about a possible location of his later, second stela. As the habit of establishing stelae as markers of accomplishment in military campaigns was of a decisive implication for Egyptian pharaohs, here too, we would expect to find the ultimate stela of Thutmose III in the eighth campaign in the most emblematic of all places he visited during this campaign. This place was, to every reason, on the east bank of the Euphrates.

The Gebel Barkal stela provides us with the first clue. As mentioned above, Helck suggested to differentiate between the location in which a certain stela was extracted – the west bank of the Euphrates – and its place of erection. His recognition of the east bank of the Euphrates as the final destination of this stela is tentative but conforms with the progress of events. This argument hints at the format of the second stela, probably a free standing one. The majority of the Egyptian free standing stelae found in the Levant have been unearthed in urban settlements and Egyptian outposts.241 On the other hand, the so-called second stela of Thutmose III in the eighth campaign was apparently positioned in the bare landscape.

Returning to the citation from the Gebel Barkal stela, we may recall the designation of the place where a stela was established by Thutmose III as Dw pf – ‘that mountain (yonder)’, which is to be distinguished from the place of its extraction – another Dw on the west bank. Now, the term Dw, which seems to be utilized as a definer of a topographical feature might be found appropriate in perspective of the location of this stela. Although differences of level between the valley bed and the rising steppe on its margins are rather minor, up to 100 m. or so, the elevated, steep escarpments on both sides of the valley were considered to be of the ‘high’ land. Using the classifier Dw in context of the stela episode in Egyptian inscription, therefore, is apparently in accord with the attitude to the local topography of the Euphrates valley by the residents of the valley themselves as ‘mountains’.242 Both opposing places, therefore, of extraction and establishment of the stela, were probably the slopes of the steppes, delineating the boundaries of the Euphrates valley.

Another piece of information pertaining to the second stela might be found on a tantalizing fragment from the Philadelphia Museum, probably a segment of an inscribed royal stela. The remaining fragmentary inscription narrates an episode regarding a royal stela, standing on the bank of the Euphrates and develops southward to Egypt. First, a location is specified there as ‘. . . on its north, upon the east . . . ’ (‘. . . hr mhtj.f /ibtt . . . ’.243 Spalinger was probably right in identifying the object of this indicator of direction as the Euphrates,244 reflected by the suffix ‘f’. In the remaining part of the second line the presence of a king on a bank of the Euphrates – for which the term Pfr-wr presumably stands here – is attested. These details are thought-provoking for their potential implication for the search of the second stela of Thutmose III in the eighth campaign.

A location of some sort of article, or another object of undefined nature, east and north of the Euphrates at the same time, is in agreement with my suggestion to identify the ‘Big Bend’ of the Euphrates as the scene of the Egyptian activity along the Euphrates. A stela established on the east bank, somewhere north of the city of Emar and south of the great Tells of Munbaq, Haditi or the like would relate to the river valley precisely from such a position. As much as this correlation seems to be questionable it still nicely fits with the hypothesis presented here.

The other issue arising from the text carved on the Philadelphia fragment is the handing over of an item, the identity of which is not preserved, in the presence of the unnamed king who is referred to in this fragment as staying on the bank of the Euphrates. It probably has to be recognized as the item removed from the Euphrates region down to Thebes in Upper Egypt. The explanation for this episode focuses on the identification of this undefined item as a royal stela. This removed stela which was recognized as either belonging to the ruler of Mitanni245 or to a certain Egyptian king who could be the one who was responsible for its erection.246 The original place of the removed object, apparently a stela, is not evoked in the Philadelphia fragment but it is implied there that this occasion was matchless, conveying the extension of former achievements of Egyptian rulers in the Euphrates region. It is tempting, therefore, to use this evidence as an endorsement for locating a second stela of Thutmose III in the eighth campaign on the eastern bank of the Euphrates.

Finally, we come to another crucial aspect: the meaning of the stela established by Thutmose III in the Euphrates region. As this topic is too complicated and multi-faceted to be dealt with here it will be sufficient to mention two main interpretations for their meaning:

1. They were markers of actual limits of territorial expansion.
2. They were symbols of ideological expansionist world-view.

The second interpretation seems more likely, given that this kind of stelae implied victory and submission of a defeated enemy, even without achieving actual triumph in the battle field. This interpretation is in accord with the Egyptian sources and compatible with the apparent orientation of the eighth campaign – demonstration of Egypt’s might and role among the superpowers of the era.
CONCLUSION

1. The literary style adopted by the author of the Annals Inscription to narrate the eighth campaign reflect the spirit of the narratives of most later campaigns of Thutmose III. An apparent indication of this is the similarity between the way the eighth campaign and other major later campaigns conducted by Thutmose III in the Levant were perceived.

2. In the preparation phase of his eighth campaign Thutmose III made use of the formerly established logistic base in the Levant. The most intricate components of this campaign, namely, the boats' construction for the crossing of the Euphrates, could have been accomplished in relative ease due to the uninterrupted availability of raw materials and accumulated experience in technical knowledge of boat construction and methods of land transportation.

3. The march of the Egyptian army from the Lebanese coast to the Euphrates probably took one of the most convenient passageway, along the Eleutheros Valley, then moving towards Aleppo, whence it turned eastward to the Mid-Euphrates, somewhere along the 'Big Bend'. The meeting point with the Euphrates was presumably at a distance from Carchemish, in the extended territory known as 'Land of Carchemish'. According to the written sources, there was no substantial military activity along the route to the Euphrates.

4. The military operation in the Euphrates region was of the type of violent incursion including acts of destruction and expulsion of an undefined force headed by the ruler of Mitanni. At least part of this operation was conducted by sailing upon the river.

5. The proposed layout of the eighth campaign can be corroborated by the results of the archaeological explorations in the Euphrates region combined with the available historical knowledge about Bronze Age Syria.

6. The objective of the eighth campaign, portrayed as insinuous in terms of military goals and achievement, can be estimated also from the stelae established by Thutmose III in this campaign. A second stela he had possibly erected on the east bank of the Euphrates might hint at a demonstrative, symbolic, meaning of this campaign. According to the written sources, there was no substantial military activity along the route to the Euphrates.

The eighth campaign presents contradictory trends. On the one hand, it shows impressively performed capacity in tactical and logistical management. On the other hand, this performance does not seem to have brought about an achievement in terms of military objectives. Only two years later, during the tenth campaign of Thutmose III, came the decisive confrontation between Egypt and Mitanni.

In order to appreciate appropriately the goals and meaning of the eighth campaign of Thutmose III, including the events occurred during the journey home from the Euphrates, which have not been dealt with here, one should search for other factors playing a role in the instigation of Thutmose III’s farthest venture ever. These factors are not always visible in the Egyptian sources, and can only be brought out by merging the study of the eighth campaign with the field of international relations in the ancient Near East.

NOTES

4 See discussion below in context of the problem of the stelae.
7 Redford 2003, 51-73.
10 Udv IV, 687.7-10; Redford 2003, 68.
11 Redford 2003, 220.
12 From the turn of the 19th/20th century: James H. Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt: Historical Documents from the Earliest Times to the Persian Conquest: Collected, Edited and Translated with
This is mainly valid starting with the fifth campaign,

10 Redford 2003, 220-223 n.3.
13 This is mainly valid starting with the fifth campaign, year 29. The parts commemorating years 24-28 of Thutmose III were only partially preserved in the Annals Inscription. For an alternative restoration, see: Raymond O. Faulkner, *Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972 [repr. 1991]: 89 (240-244), 90 (246-247), 97 (280-281), 98 (282); Urk. IV, 645-754.
15 This is mainly valid starting with the fifth campaign, regnal year 29. The parts commemorating years 24-28 of Thutmose III were only partially preserved in the Annals Inscription. For an alternative restoration, see: Raymond O. Faulkner, *Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972 [repr. 1991]: 89 (240-244), 90 (246-247), 97 (280-281), 98 (282); Urk. IV, 645-754.
16 Redford 2003, 23-34.
17 These events are referred to in this synoptic survey by means of the Annals Inscription only. All other relevant citations and references to each of these episodes will be utilized throughout this study. Additionally, more details which are not included in the ‘Annals’ narration will be incorporated.
18 Redford 2003, 210-216.
A thorough analysis of the topographical lists from the time of Thutmose III was undertaken by the present author in: Yosef Mizrahi, *Egyptian Foreign Policy in the Levant during the reign of Thutmose III* – Continuity or Change? Ph.D. thesis, University of Haifa (Haifa, 2005) (in Hebrew with English abstract). The revised and updated results of this study are to be published in the near future.


*Urk.* IV, 891.16-893.14 respectively.


*Urk.* IV, 1370.

*Urk.* IV, 930.16-931.3.

*Urk.* IV, 1466-1467.

Gebel Barkal Stele: *Urk.* IV, 1232.1-6; Redford 2003, 204 n.16.


For a general survey of wood types used for ships building, see: Bardinet 2008, 149-161. For preferable qualities of the Cedar for ships and boats building, see: Bardinet 2008, 149-161. For preferable qualities of the Cedar for ships and boats building, see: Bardinet 2008, 149-161.


77 Mainly shipped by the Asians themselves or that which had been seized by the Egyptians. For Kamosis, see: Labib Habachi, The Second Stela of Kamose and His Struggle Against the Hyksos Ruler and His Capital, Abhandlungen des Deutsches Archäologisches Institut Kairo 8 (Glückstadt: J.J. Augustin, 1972): 37 n.f [Kamose II.14-15]. For Ahmose, see: Urk. IV, 23.10-13; Donald B. Redford, “A Gate Inscription from Karnak and Egyptian Involvement in Western Asia During the Early 18th Dynasty,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 99 (1979): 274. For Hantaspes, see: Urk. IV, 373.3-4.

78 The regularity of the timber supply from Lebanon, regardless of any specific event, might be demonstrated by the harbors provision report for year 34: Urk. IV, 707.10-14; Redford 2003, 80.

79 ‘sent off with its ballast in good order without missing a single season each and every year’ (swrrj t m[t]'[w]m snt twr [irj tgr ngt nbyt); Urk. IV,1237.9-14. Translation: Redford 2003, 111.

80 Implied in the Annals Inscription, year 34, as has been suggested by Redford 2003, 80 n.139, and in the Gebel Barkal stela: Urk. IV, 1237.15-16, 1241.13. The Gebel Barkal stela is much clearer concerning the army’s responsibility for cutting wood in Nubia: Urk. IV,1237.7-14. However, the army did not exclusively carry out this mission, for we know of Sennefer, official of the Egyptian court who journeyed to Lebanon specifically to obtain two flag-staves for Karnak temple: Urk. IV, 532-536.4; Eckhard Eichler, “Die Reisen des Sennefer,” Studien zur ältestenkultur Kultur 26 (1998): 219-228; Redford 2003, 174-175. For a survey of representations and citation of wood supply by the time of Thutmose III, see: Baredin 2008, 228-241.


83 ‘I hewed out a processional-bark of cedar . . . upon the shore of Lebanon in the fortress . . . ’ (sw n ml. n bm.i nmr t hmt t štx . . . hr nrjt [mi] Bnn n mnwrt . . . . . . .); Urk. IV,1241.17-19; Redford 2003, 115 n.48. We can only guess whether the ‘vicinity of the mistress of Byblos’ reached up to Ulliais, north of Byblos.

84 Durring 1995, 56-136, 173-184 plates 7-11. Strongholds could have maintained workshops for carpentry familiar from Egypt as construction sites for boats, i.e. the wwrjt. ibid. 196-197 [3.1]; Dilibyn Jones, A Glossary of Ancient Egyptian Nautical Titles and Terms (London: Kegan Paul International, 1988): 203 (3). Glenville has identified the wwrjt as a “dry” dockyard, detached from shores, or banks of bodies of water: 1932, 11 n.9. This rendering is well in accord with a possible use of a fortress as the site of the boats’ construction.

85 Faulkner 1946, 40.


88 Creasman and Doyle 2010, 16.

89 Urk. IV, 1232.4. For the identification of the wrrjt-type of vehicle drawn by oxen in this case as a cart and war chariot, see: Creasman and Doyle 2010, 23.

90 Ibid. 21-23.

91 The Gebel Barkal stela informs about flag-staves which had been hewn by command of foreign rulers from Lebanon and dragged to the seashore by means of oxen, although no carts are mentioned: Urk. IV,1242.7. Redford identifies these staves as belonging to the pair

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which was erected in front of the seventh pylon: 2003, 115 n.51.

Redford 2003, 226 n.28. Here, it is worth raising another possibility, pertaining to the involvement of local Syrian staff in the process of the boats' building. Since the occasion of the eighth campaign was a one-time venture of its kind in foreign terrain we may not preclude the possibility that adaptation of local knowledge of boats construction was made to the meet the expected challenge in this particular region. This might implied from the information we have about involvement of Syrians in boats industry in Egypt after the eighth campaign, possibly as a consequence of an early cooperation. Presence of Syrians boats builders in Egypt is attested in the logs of Peru-Nefer (BM 10056): Stephen R. K. Glanville, "Records of a Royal Dockyard of the Time of Tuthmosis III: Papyrus British Museum 10056, Part I" Zeitschrift für Ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde 68 (1932): 120; idem 1932, 27 n.83. In addition, more evidence for presence of Syrians in Peru-Nefer is available: David Fabre, Seafaring in Ancient Egypt (London: Periplus, 2005): 139-140. The date of these logs is later than the eighth campaign, since the future Amenophis II is mentioned there as a crown prince: der Manuelian 1986, 13 n.45, 75 n.148, 262. In addition, we may recall an exceptional shipment of various sorts of Syrian ships to Egypt in year 34 of Thutmose III, together with raw materials for ships building: Urk. IV, 707.10-14; Redford 2003, 80 n.138. This date is one year after the eighth campaign. Further investigation is needed in order to verify a possible linkage between the Egyptian activity in Syria during the eighth campaign and what seems to be a new momentum in the Egyptian ships building industry.

95 Ud. IV, 890.14-891.1.
96 Redford 2003, 170 n.30.
97 Faulkner 1946, 39.
99 Redford 1992, 159.
100 Ud. IV,690.17-691.1-11. Another attack on Ullaza can tentatively be assigned to the fifth campaign, year 29; Ud. IV, 685.8. On the problem of the orthography of the referred name as Ullaza in this year’s report, see: Redford 2003, 64-65.
102 Redford 2003, 77.
105 Ud. IV, 188,15.
106 Redford 2003, 123, 127.
107 Gabriel 2009, 162, 169.
109 For alternative routes the Egyptians could have accessed, see: Spalinger, 2005: 114-115.
110 Ud. IV, 891.2, 8.
111 Ud. IV, 891.2-3.
112 Redford 2003, 168 n.15.
113 Redford, 1992; 159; Helck 1971, 139; Faulkner 1946, 40; Gardiner 1947, 157.
114 Redford 2009, 170.
116 Gabriel 2009, 170. Redford also admits the crucial role played by Quatna in this context: 2003, 222 n.6.
117 For alternative routes the Egyptians could have accessed, see: Spalinger, 2005: 114-115.
118 Ud. IV, 891.2, 8.
119 Ud. IV, 891.2-3.
120 Redford 2003, 168 n.15.
121 Redford, 1992; 159; Helck 1971, 139; Faulkner 1946, 40; Gardiner 1947, 157.
123 Gabriel 2009, 170.
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117 *Urk.* IV, 891.8-11.


124 All major tell sites, starting from Tell Halidi southward, reveal common cultural traits characterizing the orbit of Emar, one of the central sites of the region of Aštata: Yamada 1996, 263-268.


126 Ibid., 220 n.100 with bibliography.

127 Hans Gustav Gütberbok *The Deeds of Suppiluliuma as Told by his Son Maršili II.* *Journal of Cuneiform Studies* 10.3 (1956): 92, 94, 96.

128 Horst Klengel, “Nochmals zur Rolle der Herrscher von Halab und Karkamis in der hethitischen Großreichszeit,” in Thomas Richter, Doris Prechel and Jörg Klinger (eds.) *Kulturgeschichten: Alterorientalische Studien für Volkert Haas zum 65. Geburtstag* (Saarbrücken: Saarbrücker Druckerei und Verlag, 2001): 191-192 n.6. It is intriguing to note that the region, or land, of the former Middle Bronze Age Euphrates kingdom of Ḫana still retained its name in the second half of the Second Millennium B.C.E. when the kingdom had already been far beyond its heyday: Maria Grazia Masotti Rouault, *Cultures locales du moyen-Euphrate: modes et evenements*, Ier-IIer mill. av. J.-C. Subartu 8 (*Tirrathèque*, Belgium: Brepols, 2001): 47-53; Kühn 1999, 205 n.9, 214 n.68. Therefore, it supports the feasibility that the traditional sub-division of the Euphrates region, also referring to the ‘Land of Carcemish’, goes back in time beyond the Late Bronze Age.

129 An interesting case in point is the striking similarity of sealing designs from Umm el-Marra to royal sealing designs from Carchemish of the Middle Bronze Age: Glenn M. Schwartz, Hans H. Cuvers, Sally S. Dunham, Jill A. Weber, “From Urban Origins to Imperial Integration in Western Syria: Umm el-Marra 2006, 2008,” *American Journal of Archaeology* 116.1 (2012): 182-183. Whether this can serve as an indication to the extent of a direct influence of Carcemish in this period is a moot point.

130 *Urk.* IV,697.3-9. Translation: Redford 2003, 74. Note that whereas the Arman Stela retains the same designations for the targeted settlements i.e. dmîw and wryt (*Urk.* IV, 1245.20-1246.1), the Gebel Barkal Stela suggests a different designation for the urban type of settlements in this case: rîwrt (*Urk.* IV, 1231.7-19). Whether this difference bears any significance remains conjectured.

131 Another possible affirmation for the destruction campaign led by Thutmose III may be found on an inscribed block, formally assigned by Sethe to the second campaign of Thutmose III: *Urk.* IV, 675-678. This notion was rejected by Spalinger 1977, 51 for a number of reasons. Redford 2003, 223-224 considered this block as a part of the narrative of the eighth campaign for its fluent literary style. The remaining lines provide a view of the king's action on a certain campaign with regard to destroying and plundering settlements, in a manner respective to the style used for
the eighth campaign. This notion is acceptable provided that the reading of the lines is made in a retrograde way. For this, Redford’s suggestion should remain tentative.

Although Redford (2003, 197) prefers to denote the campaign: ‘after the one who approached him’ (hr-s1 ph sw); Uruk IV, 1232.8. This statement is completely vague and there is no clue as to any particular historical ground for this particular encounter, except for the lasting hostility between Egypt and Mitanni extant by that time. Uruk IV, 1232.8-9.

For recollections in autobiographies, see: 143 Redford 2003, 224-225, as in the Euphrates campaign:

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For the pastime this debate has reached, see: Redford 2003, 74 n.101.

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According to the probable interpretation of the term \textit{tb/h/bnw Mtn} (Urk. IV, 616.8, 931.1, 1232.9, 1347.13) as a federation of local Hurrian and Semite kingdoms, which were subservient to Mitanni: Redford 2003, 231-232; Faulkner 1946, 41; Gardner 1947, 178; Klenegl 1978, 106 ns.69-70; Kühne 1999, 206 ns.19-21.

Gebel Barkal stele: Urk. IV, 1232.10.

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Urk. IV, 931.1-3.

Urk. IV, 657.16-658.4.

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Urk. IV, 658.10.

Urk. IV, 698.4-8.


Compare to the Egyptian terminology which probably differentiate between the army forces and a para-military factor called \textit{rm.t}. Urk. IV, 650.3-5.

Compare, for example, to the difference between cities that had been plundered and those which capitulated by having pacified themselves (\textit{irt htp}) in the ninth campaign: Urk. IV,704.5-6.

The capture in Megiddo is the most remarkable; Urk. IV, 663.3-664.7.

329 the-warriors in the fifth campaign: Urk. IV,686.5 and 492 POW from the seventh campaign: Urk. IV,691.2 to name but a few.


For example, \textit{Tell es-Sweyhat}: Tony J. Wilkinson,
Yosef Mizrachy | The Eighth Campaign of Thutmose III Revisited


For bibliography of Rudolph H. Dornemann on Tell Hadid, see: Wilkinson, Miller, Reichel, and Whitcomb 2004, xxix-xxx.

This site possibly started flourishing as a Mid-Euphrates hub in the mid-16th century: Dittmar Machule, Rainer Maria Czichon, Peter Werner and Walter Mayer, Die Ausgrabungen in Tell Mušḫaqa/Ekalte. Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichung der Deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft 97, 102, 108, 118 (Saarbrücken: Saarbrücken Drucker und Verlag, 1998-2008).


The role played by the agricultural hinterland of the Mid-Euphrates valley, and its reciprocity with the urban component of the area, is well reflected in transactional documents from Emar of the late Hittites empire: Maurizio Viano, “The Economy of Emar I.” Auda Orientalis 28 (2010): 259-283.


The case of Emar is the most revealing in this context, starting under the sway of Elba in the 3rd millennium B.C.E., through later subordination to Mari, Mitanni and Hatti: Cohen 2009, 14-16; Regine Prussinsevsky, “Emar and the Transiton from Hurrian to Hittite Power,” in Mathis Heinz and Marian H. Feldman (eds.). Representations of Political Power: Case Histories from Times of Change and Dissolving Order in the Ancient Near East (Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2007): 21-37. Emar is also the major source of information about the inherent unrest prevailing in the Mid-Euphrates region, although most of the relevant documentation is dated to the 13th Century B.C.E.; Michael Antour, “Who Was the King of the Hurrian Troops at the Siege of Emar?” in Mark. W. Chavalas (ed.) Emar: The History, Religion and Culture of a...
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For the best survey, see: Morris 2005.

“starvation” rations, as defined by Redford, 2003: 200-201.


Ibid.


Ibid. 451-456.


Heagren 2007, 143-144.
Generally speaking, sources for the study of this aspect of the Mid-Euphrates history are spread between Hurrian, Hittite, Mesopotamian and Levantine studies. As ambiguous and chronologically unsound as they might seem, they nevertheless provide a contexture of details which can comprise a relatively intelligible historical portrayal of the region.

252 Ut IV, 697.3-9.
253 Most of the commentators provided translations without arguing for their preference from the grammatical viewpoint.
254 Gardiner 1979, 392 §478.
255 Hence, Helck's restoration for the opening line of the stela: Thutmosis III set up the stela.
257 Gardiner 1947, *175 n.1. There, he rejects Reisner's suggestion that the stela was carved on the west side.
258 Compare to the repeating use of the explicit term wD in a paralleling allusion to the stela set by Thutmose III in Asia and Nubia, the land of Miu, in the Armant stela: Ut IV, 1246.2-5.
259 By rendering a pluperfect by which the crossing of the Euphrates and the destruction campaigns precede the setting of the stela: Redford 2003, 223.
261 Using a body of water termed in the Tombos Stela: Claro 1993, 147-149; Cumming 1982, 2-3; Helck 1961, 7-8. For Armant stela, see: Margaret S. Reisner, "Inscribed Monuments from Gebel Barkal, The main sources for the Asiatic campaign of Thutmose I are the Autobiographies of Ahmose son of Abana and Ahmose Pennekhbet: Ut IV, 9.8-10.3, 36.9-11 respectively. Asiatic toponyms decorating doorpost from the Karnak temple, first attributed by Redford to Amennopis I, are now considered to be landmarks on the route of Thutmose I' Asiatic campaign: Louise Bradbury, "The Tombos Inscription: A New Interpretation." Serapis 8 (1984-1985): 19; idem, "Nefer's Inscription: on the Death Date of Queen Ahmose-Nefertary and the Dead Found Pleasing to the King," Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt 22 (1985): 77-79; Redford 1979, 270-287; idem, 2003, 185 n.4. Based on a body of water termed in the Tombos Stela: Mw pf kwd hldr m mnj = the reversed water upon which one who sails Northwards (actually) sails Southwards': Ut IV, 85.14; Bradbury 1984-1985, 4-5 n.28-30. For counter identification, see: Baligh 1997, 278 n.441; Bradbury 1984-1985, 5 ns.32-33; Morris 2005, 31 n.21. For attempts to settle the chronological discrepancy inherent in the Tombos stela which rules out the identification of this body of water as the Euphrates, see: Torgny Save-Söderbergh, "Mesopotamia and Nubia, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte altägyptischer Außenpolitik" (Lund: Hakan Ohlssons Boktryckeri, 1941): 147-149; Redford 1973, 43 n.33.
273 This notion is corroborated by seizures of war chariots and their horses by Ahmose son of Abana and Ahmose Pennekheber. In addition, Redford has tentatively suggested that the war chariots scene in the temple of Thutmose II should be attributed to the Asiatic campaign of his father, in an act of honoring the achievements of Thutmose I on the battle field: Redford 1992, 154 n.122. Note also a grant of land made for Kari, the king’s charioteer, probably in reward for his participation in a military campaign: Ballagh 1997, 191-192, Redford 1979, 276 no.3.


275 Spalinger 1982, 77-80.

276 Urk. IV, 36.10.

277 Urk. IV, 9.11-12.


279 Kühne 1999, 204 n.5.


282 Buccellati 1990, 95-96.

283 Spalinger 1978, 35-36 fig.1.

284 Ibid. 36 n.a.

285 Redford’s alternative, to recognize the antecedent as the ‘other’ (kj) stela established by Thutmose III next to a stela of Thutmose I (2003, 150-151), is less convincing for the following reason: if a second stela of Thutmose III was established on the east of the Euphrates, at a distance from a stela of Thutmose I, as I suggest here, then it can by no means refer to the one established next to his grandfather’s. Since I have not had the chance to collate the Philadelphia fragment personally, I avoid any commentary on Redford’s remark about the existence of traces which suit the hieroglyphs of kj.

286 Spalinger 1978, 41.

287 Presumably Thutmose III, although the identity of the king who was responsible for removing it from the Euphrates region to Egypt can differ: Redford 2003, 151.