

**JAPANESE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN THE TOKUGAWA AND  
POST-WORLD WAR II PERIODS:  
CHANGES IN FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION**

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**ABSTRACT:** The notion that economic changes embedded in Japan's transition from an agriculturally-based to an industrially-based economy have been associated with corresponding changes in family structure and organization is tested. Changes which did occur were relative and not absolute. Changes in Japanese social organization since 1600 have not been uniform but in fact have been quite varied depending on socio-economic and ecological conditions. Current Japanese trends of decreasing agriculture and increasing industrial urbanization will lead to a continuation in the emergence of the single-person and nuclear family households, equal succession and inheritance, "love" marriages, and neolocal residence as the dominant forms. Nevertheless, the Japanese people are unique in their ongoing attachment to their rich cultural heritage. As long as this loyalty continues, the *ie* principle will continue to hold an important position in their social lives.

To say that Japan has undergone dramatic changes during the past 400 years would be an understatement. History has seen Japan transform from a relatively isolated, rurally-based nation to one of the most dominant, modernized, and influential economic powers in the world today. Consequently, it is natural to assume that equally dramatic changes have taken place in Japan's social structure as well. It is upon this assumption that I wish to focus this paper. My specific purpose, then, is to test the notion that the economic changes embedded in Japan's transition from an agriculturally-based to an industrially-based economy have been associated with corresponding changes in family structure and organization. In order to reduce the historical scope of this paper, only two periods will be examined in detail: the Tokugawa Era, and the Post-World War II era.

In order to adequately accomplish this, the scope must be qualified in one more area, that which I call, for lack of a better word, "class". What I am trying to distinguish here is not specific class differences in the traditional sense of stratified social structure; I am more interested in the fact that variation existed among different population groups occupying different ecological and occupational niches. Hence, I will examine each historical period in association with three different "class" groups. In the Tokugawa period, I will examine family and household changes in regards to: the "peasant class" working in agriculture in the rural areas; the "merchant class" working in commerce in the urban areas; and the "aristocracy" occupying the political and administrative positions. In the modern period, I will look at: farmers working in rural areas; "middle" and "working class" populations working as clerks, sales people, small enterprise owners, public service workers, and production laborers in the urban areas; and the "ruling" and "upper class" running the country politically and economically. While I understand that "class" as a social concept is much more complex than this and that the "classes" I have mentioned could easily be further subdivided, the breakdown should be sufficient for the purposes of this paper.

The outline for this paper will proceed in four main sections. The first will include a brief description of the Tokugawa and Post-World War II periods in Japanese history. The second will discuss the "ideal" patterns of family and household structure and organization which have received the bulk of the attention from social scientists. This discussion is very important because it is these patterns which have been most commonly associated with Japanese family and household systems, and it is these which I will test for applicability in the next two sections. The third and fourth sections, then, are meant to be "real" or "on the ground" descriptions of Japanese kinship structures. The third section will examine family and household structure and organization and its variations with class in the Tokugawa period, and the fourth section will do the same for the Post-World War II period.

Prior to commencing this discussion, the definition of a number of key terms are in order. First, it is important to clearly differentiate between the terms "family" and "household" because there has been a failure in the past to do so (Goody 1972:106). "Family", as utilized in this discussion, refers to a reproductive unit based on kinship. It is primarily a structural system though it does not necessarily denote a complete co-resident group (Laslett 1972:28, Wilk & Netting 1984). "Household", on the other hand, refers to a dwelling group and unit of production and consumption. Unlike family, it is both structural and functional and separate from kinship (Wilk & Netting 1984). A second area worthy of mention concerns the different types of family household systems discussed in this paper. A nuclear family household is a domestic group with only one married couple. Two generations are typical, but more are possible. A stem family household refers to a three-generational domestic group comprised of one and only one conjugal pair per generation and their unmarried children. There are at least two generations with married couples present. An extended family household, finally, is a multi-generational domestic group which includes collateral kin and permits more than one conjugal pair per generation. All of these household types may include non-kin members as well.

The first major section of this paper concerns a brief description of the two historical periods of interest. The first period, the Tokugawa Era, lasted from 1600 to 1868 and was named after the powerful military family which gained political control from the Emperor. The Tokugawa Shoguns established a system of government characterized as "centralized feudalism". Under this system, the land was divided into a number of political domains under the relatively autonomous control of local feudal lords. The nation, which had limited foreign relations during this period, grew in population from an estimated 10-18 million in 1600 to approximately 26 million in 1868 (Hanley & Yamamura 1977).

A number of changes took place during this period. A rigidly constructed Confucian class system was instituted with accompanying sumptuary and behavioral rules. The major classes included Samurai, farmers, artisans, and merchants. None of these classes were homogeneous, and they often varied greatly in wealth (Smith 1988:70). Economically, the Tokugawa period was one of slow but constant growth (Hanley & Yamamura 1977). The economy was primarily agricultural and somewhat commercial, but not yet industrialized (Nakamura 1981; in Long 1987:18). The organization of labor was largely household-based, and cottage industry became more and more common as the period progressed (Smith 1988:100). The land was taxed heavily by the Tokugawa Shogunate, but evidence shows that farming "paid" and was even capable of bringing in a surplus (Smith 1988:69). Not all of Japan was rural though. Urbanization, which began in Japan as early as the eighth century

A.D., was highly developed in the Tokugawa period by contemporary standards. There were hundreds of castle towns, port towns, and marketing centers which provided a livelihood for the merchant class. By 1700, 5-7% of the population lived in cities with populations greater than 100,000 (Long 1987:16). Family structure in all of this was a matter of local concern, just as long as taxes were paid and public order maintained. The Tokugawa period ended with the restoration of the Emperor in 1868 and the beginning of industrialization.

The "modern" period of Japan began with the end of World War II and the American occupation of Japan. At this time, a vast reorganization of society was initiated to disarm and democratize the country. This included a new Constitution which among other things relegated the Emperor to symbolic status, gave political sovereignty to the people, disarmed the military, and reformulated the legal and education systems after American models.

Other changes took place as well. A new class system was emerging. Fukutake (1962:27) classified the nation into three major classes: a small ruling class (including capitalists, allied big landowners, politicians, and highly placed bureaucrats); a middle class (composed of the old middle class of small landowners, factory owners, and shop keepers, and the new middle class of clerical officers of government, public office, and large enterprises); and the ruled masses (including farmers, merchants, laborers, and artisans).

Economic changes also took place. The new Constitution established land reform. This abolished the hierarchical relations inherent in the landlord system and created a class of "independent" farmers, most of which now held small plots of land already at the minimum size limit for the subsistence of a family of five (Raper 1950:213). There was consequently a change in the agricultural labor force. In 1955, over 40% of the population were still involved in farming, forestry, and fishing. By 1980, only 10.8% were involved in these occupations, and not all full-time (Fukutake 1982:108). Agriculture was becoming more mechanized, and fewer workers were required. The post-war period was also a time of extremely rapid economic development and urbanization. There was a strong increase in such urban occupations as professional and technical workers, clerical workers, sales workers, and especially production workers. More and more married women began working as wage earners outside of the home, and the family underwent an increasing standardization of form due to new legal standards, education, and the media. The influx that took place from the farms to the urban areas occurred primarily because farming by itself was no longer economically sufficient. This shift was reflected by demographic changes. In 1950, the ratio of rural to urban dwellers was 62:38; by 1975, it had become 30:70 (Smith 1978:67). Over the course of the postwar period, the total population of Japan rose from 72 to 112 million, reflecting, among other things, a great increase in longevity when compared to the Tokugawa period (Shioji 1980:27).

It is now time to examine the "ideal" norm of family and household structure and organization commonly associated with traditional Japan. This standard model is based on early Japanese ethnologies conducted primarily in the village setting during times when 70-80% of the population lived in rural areas (Smith 1983:51). What resulted was a standard model of Japanese social organization, a model which heavily influenced much of the later work on the Japanese family and household. The following areas of the "ideal" family household system will be described: the basic principles of kinship and descent, family household structure and size, patterns of succession and inheritance, patterns of marriage and

residence, and kin and household relations.

Much of the early work on Japanese social organization focused heavily on patrilineal descent as the major rule of kinship. This is not surprising because, at first sight, the basic units of Japanese kinship, such as the traditional family, do appear to be structured along patrilineal lines. However, it is the corporate household, and not the lineage itself, which is the primary element of Japanese social organization (Pelzel 1970:233).

The key concept necessary for understanding the Japanese family household is *ie*. *Ie* is both a social unit and a social concept. As a unit, *ie* refers to the traditional stem family of Japan characterized by large size, lineality, and corporateness in the sense that the emphasis is on the household (e.g. the family name and occupation) rather than on its individual members<sup>1</sup>. However, it also includes the house, property, resources for carrying on the family occupation, and the graves of the ancestors (Fukutake 1982:28). At the center of the *ie* is the household head who unifies the *ie* via patriarchal authority (Kitano 1962:43). The house head is responsible for *ie* property and the direction and guidance of family business and labor. An important feature of *ie* as a concept is a great emphasis placed on the continuity and durability of the family household. The traditional *ie* family is conceived of as a single unbroken line including both the living and the dead (Vogel 1963:165). Inherent in this is the responsibility of transmitting family property to succeeding generations.

In the "ideal" model, the *ie* is the component unit of an even larger lineal social structure: the *dozoku*. The *dozoku* is a corporate group composed of hierarchically related *ie* units (Long 1987:9). It consists of two main parts: the *honke* -- the senior, main family residing at the apex of control, rank and prestige; and the *bunke* -- the newer branch families at the lower ranks. The *dozoku* is not essentially a kin group but a locality group existing for the organization of power (Pelzel 1970:234). The overall structure of the *dozoku* is nearly identical to that of the *ie* household except that individuals are replaced in the hierarchy by family households. The main family, led by the head of the *honke*, controls the *dozoku*. While a dominant/subordinate relationship exists between the *honke* and the *bunke*, the two are mutually dependent. The *honke* provides the *bunke* with the means of livelihood (e.g. land rights for peasants, branch shops for merchants) in exchange for labor services and participation in ancestor worship (Long 1987:9-10).

The "ideal" pattern for succession and inheritance emerging from the *ie* system is primogenitural. In this system, the oldest son succeeds the family head and inherits the family property. In return, he is responsible for the care of his parents in their old age. Impartible inheritance assures the succession of the household down through the generations.

In line with succession and inheritance, "ideal" marriage and residence patterns also support the traditional *ie* system. As the first-born son remains in his parental home from birth to death, his bride moves in with him at the time of marriage. The resulting pattern is patrilocal residence. Daughters marry out, and younger sons eventually leave home to seek

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<sup>1</sup> The role played in society by the modern company in relation to the traditional "ie" is a complex phenomena and the subject for another paper entirely. However, Fruin (1980) warns against an over-reliance on the stem family-company analogy due to its inconsistencies of application (especially to smaller companies).

their fortunes and establish neolocal households (new *ie*) of their own (Pelzel 1970:229). The household head also plays a large role in this marriage pattern. He typically arranges the marriages for all of the children (Long 1987:41).

Finally, we arrive at the standard kin and household relations characteristic of traditional Japanese families. Under the *ie* system, relations are hierarchical and subsumed by patriarchal authority (Matsumoto 1962:55). Obligations of deference and respect are required from the young to the old and from female members to male members. Also, all household members owe obeisance, submission, duty, and respect to the household head. In return, he guarantees the continuity of the family household. The *honke* and *bunke* also fall into this same type of relationship of supreme authority of the *honke* patriarch and compliance from the branch families (Kitano 1962:44).

The above description is an accurate account of the "ideal" or standard Japanese traditional family household system. These patterns were, and are still, dominant features of Japanese social organizations. Indeed, it would be impossible to understand Japanese social organization without them. However, where they fail as a descriptive tool is that they provide a rather simplistic and narrow view of Japanese society. They serve as general models for approaching Japanese society, but, as Befu (1962:34) reminds us, they do not account for the many exceptions and deviations to the model which have undeniably been taking place. Given the economically, politically, and socially diverse population found in Japan, it is hard to believe that this one model adequately describes the situation for everyone. Consequently, the next two sections will go beyond the simplistic model and explore what was actually taking place in the different ecological regions and among the different classes of people.

The third main section of this paper focuses on the Tokugawa period and examines the different variations of social organization found during that time. This section is broken down into four parts, each of which will explore the patterns of kinship and descent, family and household structure and organization, succession and inheritance, marriage and residence, and kin and household relations. The first part will give a general overview of Japanese social organization during the Tokugawa period, and the next three parts will describe some variations as they apply to the rural peasant class, the urban merchant class, and the aristocracy.

In regards to Tokugawa patterns of kinship and descent, it is apparent that Japanese social organization did not fit a simple patrilineal model. In reality, only family name and formal legal class status descended patrilineally (Pelzel 1970:232). It is more accurate so say that Japan had a bilateral descent system with a strong patrilateral emphasis. The descent system was bilateral in that kinship relations extended to father's relatives, mother's relatives, and in-laws alike (Long 1987:10). However, while these bilateral relations were of great behavioral importance, they had little ideological importance (Pelzel 1970:233). It was the household and its lineal organization as a corporate community rather than as a kin group based on individual relations that was primary to Japanese kinship and descent (Nakane 1970:13).

The "real" Tokugawa family household may be seen as operating in two distinct forms: as a kinship unit, and as a corporate unit. As a kinship unit, the genetic continuity of the family was stressed. However, this lasted only as long as the kin members resided in the household. Once they left, they were considered relatives but members of separate families

(Long 1987:7). As a corporate unit, the Tokugawa household approximated the "ideal" model. Where it differed from this model was in the inclusion of non-kin to the *ie*. This was accomplished through in-marrying, adoption, and fictive kin relations (e.g. servants) (Long 1987:7).

The Tokugawa period was characterized by a greater variety of household types than simply the "ideal" stem family household. For instance, small family households consisting of one conjugal pair and children were already becoming more common and replacing households consisting of more than one conjugal pair (Hayami & Uchida 1972:473). In practice, the typical family household was adapted to local requirements. It would be large enough to furnish household labor requirements but not so big as to over-tax available resources (Pelzel 1970:233). Household size also changed over the course of the Tokugawa period. Evidence from Suwa County showed average household size in the 1600s to be somewhere between 5 and 10 persons per household and greatly varied by district. By the mid-1700s, the mean household size stabilized at approximately 5 persons per household with relatively little variation by location (Hayami & Uchida 1972). Nakane's (1972) data for the entire country indicate a relatively constant mean household size of 5 persons throughout the Tokugawa period. We might conclude here that household population varied greatly by locale but was on the whole a far cry from some of the large extended families which have received so much attention.

In practice, the Tokugawa period succession and inheritance patterns matched the descent structure: bilateral with a patrilineal tilt. It is certain that primogeniture was the preferred pattern, but deviations occurred depending on personal or local circumstances (Raper 1950:211). A prime example arises in the case of a family with no male heir. A common solution was to adopt a male substitute into the family household. This was often accomplished by having a son-in-law move in and take on the family name. Bernstein's (1983) evidence that in-marrying son-in-laws brought with them a sort of "male dowry" indicated that this action was not held to be disrespectful (Schlegel & Eloul 1988:302). Thus, a family household in this situation was able to continue to act as a corporation in perpetuating the family name. Other deviations from primogeniture included having the house head's wife or a younger son succeed upon the househead's death. It was not uncommon to have the family property divided up between all of the sons (equally or unequally). In any event, decisions would be made for the convenience and pragmatic benefit of the household (Smith 1983:89-90).

Likewise, the "real" marriage and residence patterns were always in the best interest of the *ie*. The basis for selecting spouses would inevitably depend on a number of practical factors: the relative social statuses of the families, family histories and "stock" (e.g. history of disease), age differences, family alliances, and personal attributes (such as competency or potential future) (Long 1987:42, Raper 1950:212-213). The closer the status, the more highly regarded the marriage although families tended to try to marry their daughters--who typically married out with dowry--up in status. Given the amount of variables involved, it is no wonder that most marriages were arranged by the families, and often with the assistance of a third party to conduct the interfamilial negotiations. Arranged marriages worked because the children were usually willing to be guided by their parents (Raper 1950:212). In regards to common residence patterns, these tended to be similar to the "ideal" pattern. However, deviant cases, such as when two or more married siblings would remain in the family

household, did exist depending on economic conditions (Nakane 1972).

Kinship relations during the Tokugawa period were similar to the "ideal" model in the sense that the relationships within the *ie* were considered to be permanent and more important than all other human relationships (Nakane 1970:5). Thus, a daughter-in-law living in the household was more important than a brother living out. However, relations deviated from the "ideal" model in that the responsibility for the welfare of the household and its members fell on all of the household members, not just the patriarch. Hence, the social group in the household had an ultimate integrative power to which even the patriarch was subject. An element of consensus was necessary to insure the success of all household decisions (Nakane 1970:14, Smith 1983:53).

Bilateral kin relations also existed in the family household. Kin relations were hierarchical and based on age and gender. The parent-child relationship was the axial relationship of the family, and reverence of the ancestors was still strong at this time (Fukutake 1982). Kin relations decreased markedly when one moved from the lineal family to the collateral family (Long 1987:76-77). Outside of the household, kin relations were more determined by locality than by sanguinity, and no obligations existed in the corporate sense.

Now that we have completed the general description of social organization during the Tokugawa period, it is time to explore the differences which existed between the general description and the different "class" groups.

When describing the "peasant class" of Tokugawa Japan, it is important to acknowledge that not all peasants were working under the same conditions in all rural areas. For instance, Nakane (1972:518) distinguishes between two types of rural areas: the typical rural area with fairly intensive agriculture, and the remote area with less intensive agriculture. Some differences will be discussed below.

Peasant class social organization, of all the classes, most closely follows the above general description. This should not be surprising given that the large majority of the population was living in the rural areas. What needs to be remembered is that the average family household, while still dominated by the *ie* principle, seldom included more than one married couple (Nakane 1972:518). This was largely due to the relatively short average life spans of the peasants and the fact that most of the non-succeeding sons and daughters were moving out and establishing new nuclear households on their own.

Differences did exist between rural and remote rural households. Remote rural areas often contained large extended family households (although these were rare in Japan on the whole). These households were products of the specific economic conditions of their locales. Scarce resources and poor communication and transportation systems required residents to diversify into areas of production requiring large labor forces (Nakane 1972:525). Nakane's (1972) data from the Shirakawa-Mura area in the Gifu prefecture showed a mean household size exceeding nine persons. This is compared with "typical" rural areas having a mean household size of slightly less than 5. Also of interest is her data from Ueda fief in 1663 rural and urban household size. Rural mean household size (4.2) was actually substantially less than urban mean household size (7.2) (Nakane 1972:520). In sum, her data revealed a

"U-shaped" curve for peasant mean household size with increasing sizes occurring in areas of very poor or very favorable environmental conditions.

The peasant class patterns of succession and inheritance also followed the general model of one-son succession and inheritance, but marriage and residence patterns varied a little more. Sakai's (1975) data from Satsuma indicated that peasant marriages were more governed by function rather than status. There was an element of governmental control in the choice of spouses, and marriage restrictions were established by the Samurai governments to match people with similar economic functions and responsibilities. Marriages were thus geographically restricted (i.e. most marriages took place between people from the same or nearby villages or districts) for the purposes of protecting village industries (Sakai 1975:22). However, these restrictions were not always followed. It is also safe to say that marriages were often based on self-selection rather than solely on the dictates of the elders (Long 1987:41). Finally, remote rural marriage and residence were distinct from "typical" rural patterns in that non-successor married couples often remained in their natal households out of economic necessity (Nakane 1972:526).

As one moved away from the rural areas and towards the urban areas, there was an increase in the population of the merchant class and their commercial and small manufacturing endeavors. However, these cities and towns were far from stable communities. There was great in- and out-migration and significant household mobility. The kinship and descent systems followed the general model, but the household unit was already dominated by small households with small-family nuclei (Smith 1972:440). Nevertheless, the *ie* principle was still strong. This was exemplified by the manner in which servants and clerks would be incorporated as members into households and treated as family members by the household head (Nakane 1970:5). This incorporation of non-kin members into merchants' households was the key factor behind higher urban than rural mean household sizes in Ueda fief in 1663 (Nakane 1972).

Succession and inheritance among the merchant class was also typical in that only one son succeeded to family name, property, and keeper of the family tradition. This occurred primarily through primogeniture although adopted husband marriage and ultimogeniture (youngest son inherits) also took place (Smith 1972:441). As with the peasant class, marriage for the merchant class was subject to governmental restrictions for same functional reasons of economic cost and administrative convenience (Sakai 1975:23). Where the merchant class differed from the peasant class was that merchants with more power and wealth were more likely than farmers to arrange appropriate marriages for their children (Long 1987:41).

The historical information on the aristocratic class of the Tokugawa era is somewhat less complete, but a couple of distinctions are of interest. The privileged upper class was marked by a clearly ranked status system (e.g. upper, middle, and lower ranked samurai). However, status came not with the family but with the household (Sakai 1975:32). The nobility, more so than the lower classes (except in the remote rural areas), operated in a more heavily patrilineal kinship system. Like the great houses of the remote rural areas, the aristocracy descent patterns looked very much like ambilineal ramages with patrilineal foci. Samurai households often had many retainers and servants and were therefore larger than average in size (Sakai 1975:31). Succession and inheritance relied heavily on one-son succession (and probably primogeniture) as a means of limiting the size of the high status

nobility. Marriages were typically between people of similar status although it was possible for female servants of commoner status to marry up. The samurai were permitted to have mistresses and concubines whose status would increase if they had children by the samurai (Sakai 1975:32-3). Most marriages were arranged by the families, but there is evidence that governmental approval of marriage alliances was required for high ranking samurai, especially when the marriages crossed political or class boundaries (Long 1987:17).

The fourth main section of this paper follows the same format as that of the third, except now the focus is on what has actually taken place in Japanese social organization since World War II. On the whole, social organization during the postwar period is less similar to the "ideal" model than it was during the Tokugawa period. Consequently, this section will focus more on some of the changes which have taken place since then. The discussion of this "modern" period will start with a general description of the patterns of social organization and then follow with specific descriptions of the differences or variances arising from the three class groups of focus: the rural farming class, the urban middle and working class, and the elite ruling class.

Social organization in the modern period has revealed a decline in the importance of patrilineal descent and kinship patterns since the Tokugawa period. In exchange, there has been an increase in the importance of kin relations as a mechanism for community organization (Fukutake 1967; in Long 1987:11-12). Changes have been taking place in family and household structure and composition as well. For starters, the implementation of the New Democratic Constitution brought "legal" changes to Japanese household organization. The Civil Code of 1948 legally abolished the concept of *ie* and the traditional status of the family head (Matsumoto 1962:55). Partly as a result of these legal changes, there has been a disintegration of the patrilineal emphasis on the family household. Children are moving away from their family households, never to return, and the *dozoku* is rapidly disintegrating into sub-units. While some multi-generational households continue to persist to the present (Long 1987), the role of the *ie* institution as the distinguished unit in society is now more often being played by the company (Nakane 1970:8).

So what household form has been replacing the traditional stem family household? The standard answer to this question has been the nuclear family household (Kitano 1962). This answer is supported by data showing the percentage of people over age 65 who are supported by their families to have dropped rapidly from 77% in 1957 to 56% in 1968 (Fukutake 1974:37). What is not always mentioned here is that the biggest relative change which has taken place has not been to the nuclear household (as many nuclear households were present even in the Tokugawa period) but to the single-person household (Fukutake 1982:123). In 1980, nuclear households were the most common at 63.3% of all households (up from 59.6% in 1955). "Kin-linked" households were at 20.7% (down from 36.5% in 1955) and single-person households at 15.8% (up from 3.4% in 1955) (Fukutake 1982:124). What is unique about Japan is the rapidity with which this transition has taken place. As a consequence, the ideology supporting the *ie* system has been less easily discarded (Wilson 1986:39).

Household size has undergone a large change since World War II. Household size has decreased from about 5 persons in 1945 to approximately 3.3 persons in 1980 (Fukutake 1982:124). What makes this recent decrease in household size even more notable is the fact

that longevity has increased markedly over the past fifty years. As the mean household size changed little between the Tokugawa period and World War II, we may conclude that the process of rapid industrialism by itself was not sufficient cause for a decrease in household size.

Legal changes to the traditional system of succession and inheritance also took place after the war. The Civil Code of 1948 established equal property rights and inheritance, thus modifying the traditional form of primogeniture. Furthermore, as more and more laborers have turned to the industrial realm for employment, retirement has become distinct from succession (Long 1987:58). When one considers the trend of increasing longevity, it is not surprising that inheritance has become less meaningful; it is now commonly being spent by the elderly parents instead of handed down. Adoption, as a strategy for continuing the *ie* is also less valued (Kamiko 1981; in Long 1987:61). Nevertheless, equal inheritance by all children has not been enforced and has usually been evaded. The tendency of choosing one heir (a son) is still a dominant pattern (Matsumoto 1962:68).

Marriage patterns were also reformed after the war when the Civil Code of 1948 established freedom of marriage. This reversed a trend prescribed by Meiji leaders which instituted *ie* control over mate selection (Long 1987:42). The modern view towards marriage has also changed. Independent choice of marriage is more respected, and marriage is now seen to have value in itself (Long 1987:41). There has been a decrease in forced marriages, a decrease in emphasis on social and economic status of the spouses, and an increase in the emphasis on personal characteristics (Raper 1950:213). Marriage patterns have also become increasingly influenced by education. However, this new attitude did not change the marriage patterns completely. Arranged marriages are still relatively highly valued among older adults even though "love" or "romance" marriage is preferred by younger adults (Masatsugu 1982:106). A clear trend away from arranged marriages towards individual free choice has emerged only since the mid-1960s and the beginning of rapid economic growth (Mochizuki 1976; in Long 1987:45).

In regards to residence patterns, it has become typical for the component family members to leave the parental household to form independent families. This trend towards neolocal residence even includes the oldest son (Long 1987:41). However, Fukutake (1982:122) reminds us that while neolocal residence directly after marriage is becoming more and more common, it is still not quite the dominant form.

Finally, kin relations have also changed since the Tokugawa period. The New Democratic Constitution set forth the principles of respect for individual dignity and equality of the sexes as the bases for the new modern family (Koyama 1962:51). It is true to say that modern families are more egalitarian, on the whole, than before, but the changes have not been drastic. While sex role differentiation has been slowly decreasing, it is still clearly marked (Long 1987:48). There also appears to be conflicting evidence as to whether or not kin relations have replaced lineal relations in importance (Fukutake 1982:129, Long 1987:76).

The above discussion has been put forth as describing the most common or "standard" characteristics of postwar Japanese social organization. However, variations do exist depending on class, occupation, and location. The first group to be examined is the rural

farmers. The rural farming community of modern Japan is still regarded as the social basis of national homogeneity and solidarity. However, their social organization has undergone change. The farmer class population has decreased measurably since the Tokugawa period and rapidly since the end of World War II. The percentage of the Japanese labor force involved in agriculture was already below 39% by 1955. This percentage decreased to 23% by 1960 and 19.3% by 1965 (Nakane 1972:531). By 1980, less than 10% of the Japanese population were farmers (Fukutake 1982:152). This trend is due primarily to the relatively weak economic foundation of modern farming. Many farm families have been forced to diversify into non-agricultural occupations to get by (Fukutake 1982:94).

The basic descent and kinship patterns for the modern farmer class are still bilateral with a patrilineal emphasis. Evidence from various rural studies all confirm a continued trend towards the nuclear family and a decreased population per household (Norbeck 1978; in Long 1987, Shioji 1980, Smith 1978). However, the trend towards the nuclear family household has been weaker among farmers than among urban families. In 1960, 62% of the families in agriculture were still based on the "ideal type" stem family household (Koyama 1962:51). Higher fertility rates in the rural areas have also assisted in preventing the rapid adoption of the modern family type (Fukutake 1962:236). Nevertheless, with land reform, the creation of a *dozoku* system (i.e. dividing up the land and building additional dwellings) is almost impossible (Raper 1950:210). The remote rural areas have also seen a disintegration of the large linear households. However, as Nakane (1972:528) points out, this special case was not a reflection of changes to the traditional family system but the outcome of specific economic problems faced by these remote areas. Finally, ethnographic data has revealed a decrease in the mean household size of rural farmers as well as a difference from the typical urban household size (Smith 1978). Rural household sizes in the 1960s were approximately 0.5 greater than urban household sizes, a reversal of the Tokugawa trend (Nakane 1972).

The abandonment of farming in the modern period has also had an effect on the system of succession. As parental property was legally supposed to be divided equally among children of both sexes, this posed a problem for small farms which were already at the minimum limits for subsistence. As a result, there is still a strong tendency towards primogeniture in succession of the family headship and inheritance of property on small farms (Befu 1962:34). Parents still look to their children for support in their old age as well. In reality, Fukutake (1962) showed that in reality most farmers tend to be either unaware of or uninterested in the amended laws of succession. In the end, this preference for primogeniture is weakening, but much more slowly than in the urban areas (Matsumoto 1962:67).

The evidence for marriage patterns among the modern farmer class points to a number of distinctive characteristics. Although there is a trend towards a decrease in the number of arranged marriages (Smith 1978), more marriages are still arranged by parents and family than are made for "love" (Fukutake 1982). Furthermore, arranged marriages tend to be more common in rural areas than in urban areas. It is still common in rural areas for an inheriting son and his wife to live with the son's parents (Fukutake 1982:128). Nevertheless, ethnographic data indicates that the proportion of elderly households without children co-residing is on the increase (Smith 1978).

Finally, in regards to kin relations, paternal authority is still strong despite increasing

resentment (Vogel 1963:195). Closer relations tend to be kept with patrilineal than matrilineal relatives, and relatives are preferred over friends or neighbors in times of need (Koyama 1966).

After the onset of industrialization in the late nineteenth century, the traditional system of primogeniture and its doctrine of impartible inheritance set the stage for a large, controlled migration of rural farmers to the cities. The migrants were primarily the younger sons of stem family households. However, when a farmer moved to the city, he removed himself from membership in his former *ie* (Vogel 1967:106). Unfortunately, there were few such institutions in the cities to take its place. The closest replacement has been the ritual kinship relation which has developed between employer and employee in the Japanese company (Vogel 1967:99). Here we now turn our attention to the social organization of the middle and working classes in the post-war urban areas.

The family which established itself in the cities was typically nuclear and non-corporate and had considerable independence from the *ie* (Vogel 1967:99). The prevalence of the nuclear family type in the modern urban areas is demonstrated in Shioji's data of family type from the Suginami ward of Tokyo in 1973. Shioji found 70% of the families to be of the nuclear type while only 28% of the families were extended (1980:270). Meanwhile, as the importance of the *ie* has steadily decreased, mean household size has continued to fall as well (Nakane 1972:533). Fewer children and more crowded living quarters have added to the diminishing household size. Nakane's (1972) data indicating that mean household size in urban areas is slightly less than in rural areas suggests that the trend toward nuclear families has been stronger among urban families than among rural families.

The *ie* principle of succession and inheritance is also less well adapted to city type labor. It is not easy for a city employee to simply pass his job on to his son. Position is replacing property in importance, but position is not normally inherited (Vogel 1967:103). And even when the opportunity for succession is present, it has become common for workers in positions of authority to pass over their sons in lieu of more qualified successors (Nakane 1970:109). What property or wealth is available for inheritance after parents retire is often kept for their own use and enjoyment (Rohlen 1974:245-246). Hence, it is not surprising to find that rigid patrilineal patterns of succession have weakened among the educated, younger, and white-collar groups in the urban and industrial areas (Matsumoto 1962). Nevertheless, studies continue to find that unequal and impartible inheritance is still preferred over equal inheritance as long as the parents are guaranteed support in their old age (Arichi 1981; in Long 1987).

Rohlen, in his (1974) study of a Japanese bank, uncovered some interesting trends in modern urban marriage patterns. In regards to peoples' perceptions of marriage, he found arranged marriages to be considered out of date and those based on romance to be regarded as modern. However, modern "love" marriages were also considered to be a bit risky. While Long (1987:44-45) found "love" marriages to be more common in the urban areas, Rohlen's (1974) data of marriages at the bank between 1962 and 1974 showed arranged marriages to be in the majority (1974:239). His data indicated that the greater the age of the persons involved, the greater the chance that the marriage would be arranged (Rohlen 1974:238). Rohlen also found a new type of marriage pattern to be emerging, that which he called the "company marriage". This type of marriage is a romantically based marriage

between people working for the same firm where the company plays a role in bringing the two parties together. A boss might even act as an official go-between. In this sense, the company seems to be replacing some functions of the lineal extended family. In regards to residence patterns, young urban couples are moving away from their parents, and at a higher rate than in the rural areas (Nakane 1972:533). However, in urban family enterprises, it is still typical for the wife to move into the inheriting son's parents' home, providing there is adequate living space (Fukutake 1982:128).

In conjunction with the declining influence of the *ie* on kinship relations in the urban areas, fewer and fewer city dwellers are maintaining close contact with their home villages. Correspondingly, there has been a decrease in the functioning of kinship as an integrating factor for the larger community. Elders are receiving less filial piety (Wilson 1986:41), and less distinction is being made between heirs and non-heirs. Koyama (1966) found city dwellers to be maintaining closer relations with matrilineal relatives than patrilineal relatives. This is opposite to the rural pattern, but it does indicate the predominance of the bilateral system. Only among the old middle class (i.e. the old shopkeepers) has there been a solidarity similar to that formerly found in the rural communities (Ishida 1971:57-58).

Authority in the urban household is also becoming more decentralized. Fathers are less commanding than before, and mothers are less submissive. Husbands and wives have been able to form closer personal relationships in these more isolated and independent nuclear households (Vogel 1967:101). However, these are all only relative changes. While the patriarch in the city tends to have less authority than the patriarch in the country, he still is generally accorded great prestige and privilege by his wife and family (Vogel 1963:198).

The final class type for examination in the modern period is the ruling or elite class. These are the high government officials and the directors of large companies. While not a lot of research has been performed in this area, it appears that the elite still more closely follow the traditional *ie* and household patterns than the other classes. For instance, the urban elite still prefer the traditional inheritance pattern of passing the property onto the eldest son, who accepts it in return for care of the elderly parents (Fukutake 1982:128). It is also still common for elite families to follow the *dozoku* pattern of building new houses for their younger sons (Raper 1950:210). Finally, arranged marriages (by parents or high ranking officials) are more common among this upper class than free choice marriages (Masatsugu 1982:194-195).

After reviewing the above detailed description, a number of conclusions are worthy of discussion. The first deals with the notion of "ideal" versus "real" patterns. Basically, I agree with Long (1987:87-88) when she states that there is no single "traditional" family type. In Japan, the *ie* and *dozoku* systems described in this paper are primarily abstractions, grounded in observed behavior, but elevated to the level of a sociological model. Yet even though they are models, they have nonetheless played a very important role in the development of Japanese social consciousness, and hence, actual social organization. I also believe that Befu (1962:39) has something to say when he notes that there is a "primacy of instrumental activity over the cultural ideology." In other words, families and households must be seen as products of flexible adjustments to daily reality. Hence, even though they may carry these "ideal" models unconsciously around in their heads, families and their social

organizations must still be viewed in relation to practical benefit.

In regards to my original thesis associating the economic changes connected with the transition in Japan from an agriculturally-based to an industrially-based economy with changes in the Japanese family and household structure and organization, I can say this: some changes took place (as could be expected), and many of these have been discussed above. However, what is important here is that the changes which did occur were relative and not absolute. It must be recognized that when we speak of the nuclear family as replacing the *ie* in modern times, we are referring to relative increases in the occurrences of the nuclear family and not a disappearance of the *ie*. Furthermore, all of the data must be seen in light of the cyclical nature of families; it only takes one generation to change a household type. Finally, this paper makes it clear that the changes which have taken place in Japanese social organization since 1600 have not been uniform but in fact quite varied depending on socio-economic and ecological conditions. Generalizations inevitably open the door for inaccuracies.

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