the lessons to be learned from it.

A further problem with the case studies is that in the earlier parts of the book, the authors frequently refer to the cases the reader has not yet read. In an apparent attempt to solve this problem, short synopses of all five cases are provided at the end of Chapter One, although no explanation is offered as to why these synopses appear in the text at this point. The synopses aid the reader in recognizing case references, but they don’t provide sufficient detail to truly understand the examples presented. For example, one synopsis fails to mention the name of a key party to the collaboration. Without an adequate understanding of the cases, readers are left to page through the book for more information if they wish to understand an example used in the narrative. One might be well advised to read all five detailed case studies prior to reading the book in its entirety.

A final concern with the way that case studies are presented in the book is the order in which they appear. The first case presented, a description of the Rainforest Action Network’s efforts to influence the forest practices of Mitsubishi Corporation, had the positive outcomes of ending a boycott and sponsoring research on improving sustainability. However, it also had the consequence of damaging relations between two U.S. subsidiaries of Mitsubishi and their parent company. Furthermore, the Rainforest Action Network failed to achieve its goal of changing Mitsubishi’s forest practices. This mixed outcome collaboration is followed by a case involving Scott Paper Company in which collaboration efforts failed outright. Although these cases are important to presenting a complete picture of collaboration outcomes, one must read nearly one hundred pages before encountering an example of a collaboration success. The business person or environmentalist who picks up the book to explore the possibility of collaboration may be unduly discouraged by the first two examples offered.

Although environmental collaborations have existed for a quarter-century, relatively little has been written about them in the past ten years and few texts address private-sector environmental collaboration. The Process of Business/Environmental Collaborations responds to the field’s need for an updated text that may serve both academics and practitioners. Its focus on private-sector collaboration creates a useful new source of information and examples. For those who wish to travel the path of collaboration, The Process of Business/Environmental Collaborations provides a concise, yet comprehensive guide that may enable new partnerships between business and environmentalists.

FOOTNOTE:

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Clayton uses the rescue in October 1988 of two whales at Barrow, Alaska, “one of the most remarkable animal rescues in history,” as a window into the human relation to nature, our “connection” as she puts it, as “a microcosm of the human-environment interaction” [pp. xviii-xix]. She sets her window against a generally modern worldview in which, she thinks, humans have too much “detached” themselves from nature.

Clayton enjoys a story-telling environmental ethics. Her ethics is one that is lived—a pragmatic one (to use a word now much in vogue); but she steadily pursues what theory can justify the actions practiced in the story she recounts. The whale rescue was a quite public event, involving governments, even U.S./Soviet cooperation, and worldwide media coverage for three weeks. It caught up hundreds of individuals in the rescue effort and millions with a concern for animals. There is ample “connection” here between ethics and policy.

Clayton explores various ways of making sense of the whale rescue, as this might fit into a larger framework making sense of humans on the planet. She worries about “the possibility and the difficulty of building a more generalized concern from such localized concern” [p. 145]. The two schools of thought (“conceptual lenses”) that
help her most are that of the ecofeminists, with their sense of caring, and that of Martin Heidegger, a phenomenologist.

She sets these alternatives over against what she calls the dominant view, although, since she sketches a number of such views, there is no single dominant view. Still, she finds that these dominants all contain family resemblances: too much reason and not enough emotion, too much dualism and abstraction, too much universality, impartiality, too much conflict and resolution seeking justice and fairness [pp. 66-74].

A repeated problem, however, is that the “dominant view” is, on the whole, more pluralist than Clayton can contain. She finds within it for example simultaneously the conviction that the rescue “was grounded in respect for inherent value” in the whales [p. 76] and that “anthropocentrism is still the dominant mindset guiding our interactions with nonhumans” [p. 85]. The former certainly sounds close to some form of “caring,” as espoused by the ecofeminists, and the rescuers were almost entirely men, maybe trying to show off what they could do, but many seemingly genuinely concerned for the suffering whales. So the format of two alternatives against a dominant view gets somewhat forced at times.

Clayton’s study has the advantage of being concrete, particular, relevant, real-life, or “existential,” as the phenomenologists she favors sometimes like to put it. (Accompanying photographs take you there.) Her approach also has, as she can recognize, all the disadvantages of moving from the particular to the general, troublesome “connections.”

One worry is that such events soon become dated—history. If used in class now the main event happened when the students were in diapers. This introduces, right at the start, another “connection” problem. One has to ask whether this episode is a timeless window into some larger truths, like some Biblical parable or historic legal case. Or maybe this once-upon-a-time story is an isolated particular that cannot be extrapolated too far, a partial truth, which becomes untrue if we try to abstract out some whole truth. The “connections” could be weaker than that. A single event is seldom rich enough to reveal the full story. Maybe it is almost the other way round: whales live too rich a life; one cannot generalize from a charismatic species to an ecosystemic ethics.

Clayton is steadily concerned to find “connections” between humans and nature, as our concern for these whales shows. So far so good; every environmentalist seeks more harmony between humans and nature than we now have. We can phrase that as sustainability, or conservation, or environmental protection, or stewardship, or “connections.”

Probably most of us think that there is not much “politics” or “ethics” in wild spontaneous nature, little of either one and certainly of both combined. These appear in human culture, where ethics and policy can be debated, as Clayton is here doing. It is true, of course, that behavioral studies in animals, and especially in whales, reveal that they are social animals, more so than we previously knew. But the cumulative transmissible culture that has given us a deliberated environmental policy (“The Marine Mammals Protection Act”) or a debated environmental ethics (“biocentrism,” “ecofeminism,” “anthropocentrism,” “intrinsic value,” “environmental justice”) does seem to be distinctive to the human genius.

There are some, myself included, who worry that an ethic of “caring,” too disjoined from rational, “principled” analysis, may in fact lead us to do the wrong thing—to rescue the whales, when in fact, the better course (following “principle”) might have been to let nature take its course. Perhaps the thing to do is to draw ourselves back and remain “detached,” to observe and admire this struggle for life in which the fittest survive. (We chased off polar bears that came in to try to dine on dying whales; more “caring”? With such drawing back, we might then realize that nature is not culture; we do rescue humans fallen into the ice; we do not rescue wild animals in distress. The human ethic is disconnected from the animal ethic.

The whale episode is set in wild nature; we act on that principle in those kinds of environments. We care enough to leave them alone, in their own integrity, death included, not enriched by our rescue, meddling in nature. But little if anything of principle transfers to how we ought behave on most of our inhabited, domesticated landscapes, hybrids of nature and culture. The “connections” are different. None of the main issues on our millennium agenda: escalating populations, development, environmental justice, global warming, sustainability, are much affected by decisions to save the whales. The focus here is on what to make of wild nature.

“For almost everyone involved, leaving the whales to die painfully was never an option” [p. 77]. Clayton too seems throughout to assume that rescuing the whales was the right thing to do; the open questions are why. But maybe a let-nature-take-its-course ethic should have been the number one option. It would have been not an option but the enforced policy had the story been bison drowning in freezing ice in Yellowstone—as shown in a celebrated case there (reported in Natural History, January 1984). This option is never adequately considered; all the ethicists
surveyed can only glance at it [cf. pp. 85-86; pp. 143-144].

One might have thought that Heidegger’s emphasis on “letting be” [pp. 181-183] would commend non-interference, but not so. Through this “lens,” we want an ethic, a policy “allowing beings to unfold in their own Being without interfering,” but that gets overwhelmed with “actively promoting their Being themselves by acting concernfully on their behalf, by preserving and protecting them” [p. 182]. Well, maybe part of the being of whales in their niche is to serve as winterkill food for the bears; the ecology that supports both forms of being is what we ought to preserve and protect.

Clayton is right; the whale rescue is an intriguing and revealing story. Her thorough analysis of it can help us in a “paradigm shift: toward an ecological world view” [p. 255]. She is wide-ranging; we get summaries (quite pithy and competent ones) of most of the principal positions, alternatives she canvasses en route in the search for a framework within which to make the best sense of the whale rescue. The story of a developing environmental ethics and policy is advanced by her work; her tale is well told, and she is amply reflective and self-conscious about it. The analysis deserving its place in the growing environmental literature. I put it down concluding, as she must surely agree, that this on-going story is still unfinished.


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The environmental movement in the United States is a pluralistic and polyphonic one. The intention of Robert J. Brulleâs new book, Agency, Democracy and Nature is to bring to light the multiplicity of discourses and organizational structures at play in American environmentalism. Using Habermasâ ideal of a purely open and rational public sphere, Brulle aims to analyze the discursive frames and historical and structural components of American environmental organizations to suggest ways that American environmentalism can be transformed in the future. Although the book does not achieve the goal of tying Habermas to the analysis of the data in a heuristic way, it does present the reader with a series of interesting historical and analytical discussions that appreciate the varied legacies and expressions of contemporary environmentalism(s).

The author opens the book with an outline of our current ecological crisis. He states that a “quantum increase in the rate of social change” is required to avert the worst of the projected ecological consequences of the modern age (p. 12). Resurrecting critical theory from what he calls a “deadening scholasticism” (p. 10), Brulle aims to build a basis for using it to examine the social causes of ecological degradation. Yet without fully defining what ecological goals are possible in an ideal public sphere, he assumes that readers see the environmental crisis in the same way. This ends up working against the very idea his data reveal®¢that the public sphere is occupied by a multiplicity of perspectives on what nature and the environment mean.

Brulle reviews scientific approaches advanced in the 1980s that have explained the causes of ecological degradation. He appears to do this as a way to find a new model for understanding the social origins of ecological degradation and a new model for using theory to create a movement for social and ecological change. For this, he turns to Jurgen Habermas and reviews his model of communicative action, pointing to his movement from the everyday use of language to the formation of discourse and institutional organization (p. 23).

But not long into the text Habermasâ model begins to look a bit simplistic in view of the task at hand. First, Habermas considers that communicative action should ideally move toward a situation in which “participants harmonize their individual plans of action.” Mutual agreement based in communication forms the basis for joint action. By adopting Habermas’ neat prescription, Brulle closes himself off to the possibility that action to halt ecological degradation might proceed without “harmonized plans of action” or without agreement between parties “based on reasoned argument” (p. 24).